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Pricing Analytics for Reusable Resources
Yunjie Sun
First, we consider a fundamental pricing model for a single type of reusable resource in
which a fixed number of units are used to serve stochastically arriving customers. Customers
choose to purchase the resource based on their willingness-to-pay and the current price. If
purchased, occupy one unit of the reusable resources for a random amount of time. The firm
seeks to maximize a weighted combination of profit, market share, and service level. We
establish a series of theoretical results that characterize the strong universal performance of
static pricing in such an environment.
Second, we describe a comprehensive approach to pricing analytics for reusable resources
in the context of rotable spare parts with an industrial partner. We discuss the process
of instilling a new pricing culture and developing a scalable new pricing methodology at a
major aircraft manufacturer. We develop a novel pricing analytics approach for all rotable
spare parts. The new approach tackles the challenges of limited data availability, minimal
demand information, and complex inventory dynamics. We also present a successful large-
scale implementation of our approach which led to significant profit gains.
Third, we extend the pricing model for reusable resources to the setting of multiple
customer classes. We describe two types of heuristics for this class of problem with accom-
panying numerical experiments. In addition, we provide a universal performance guarantee
for a special case. We also discuss the role of substitution effects between different classes
of customers.
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Introduction
In this thesis, we study pricing problems for reusable resources. A reusable resource is when
the same resource to serve one customer can be used to serve future customers after service
completion. For example, hotel rooms and airplane seats are one kind of reusable resource
as they can be used to serve other customers after customers check out or the flight has
arrived at the destination. The cars and bicycles in the recently booming ride-hailing and
bicycle-sharing businesses are also good examples of reusable resources. Another example of
a reusable resource is cloud computing servers, which can be reused sequentially by different
customers to complete jobs. Moreover, reusable resources also play an very important role
in the repair industry for large machinery such as aircrafts and trains. In this industry,
a considerable amount of spare parts are known as rotable, meaning that the part can be
repaired and used to serve future customers. Other than rotable spare parts, the hangar
space at service centers is another example of reusable resources in the repair industry.
Pricing decisions are a critical task for a firm, not only for profitability but also for other
targets such as market share and service level. Because reusable resources have their own
special system dynamics, such dynamics must be taken into account in the pricing model
to obtain a good pricing policy. In this thesis, we propose a pricing model that explicitly
captures the special system dynamics as well as market competition in order to achieve
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various objectives of a firm. In the model, a fixed number of units of a reusable resource
are used to serve customers. Price-sensitive customers arrive to the system according to a
stochastic process. The usage duration is stochastic for customers who purchase the service
and the firm may incur a cost to serve the customer.
In the first part of the thesis, we analyze the pricing model when the firm attempts to
maximize a weighted combination of three central metrics: profit, market share, and service
level. Under the assumptions of Poisson arrivals, exponential service time, and a concave
revenue function, we prove that a static pricing policy simultaneously achieves at least 78.9%
of the three metrics from the optimal policy. This near-optimal property of the static pricing
policy holds for any parameter regime. In addition, we prove that a static pricing policy
guarantees 95.5% of the optimal profit in the special case where there are two units of the
reusable resource and the induced demand is linear in price. This work is detailed in Chapter
1 and Besbes, Elmachtoub, and Sun (2019b).
In the second part of the thesis, we describe a comprehensive approach to pricing analyt-
ics for rotable spare parts at a major aircraft manufacturer. Based on the pricing model for
reusable resources, we develop a novel pricing analytics approach that tackles unique chal-
lenges such as limited data availability, minimal demand information, and complex inventory
dynamics. We also discuss a large-scale implementation of our approach for all rotable spare
parts with our industrial partner, which led to an improvement in profits of over 3.9% over
a ten month period. This work is detailed in Chapter 2 and Besbes, Elmachtoub, and Sun
(2019a).
In the third part of the thesis, we consider the pricing model for reusable resources with
multiple customer classes. We propose two types of pricing heuristics to deal with the curse
2
of dimentionality. The first is to construct simple pricing policies from the optimal dynamic
pricing policy. The second is to find the optimal splitting of resources to each class and then
construct static policies for each part of the split system. We conduct numerical studies
showing the effectiveness of the two heuristics in such an environment. In addition, we
prove that, under a special case of two units and two classes of customers, a static pricing
policy that assigns one price to each class of customers guarantees 80% of the profit from
the optimal policy. We also discuss the role of substitution effects between different classes
of customers. This work is detailed in Chapter 3.
3
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Chapter 1
Static Pricing: Universal Guarantees for Reusable Resources
We consider a fundamental pricing model in which a fixed number of units of a reusable re-
source are used to serve customers. Customers arrive to the system according to a stochastic
process and upon arrival decide whether or not to purchase the service, depending on their
willingness-to-pay and the current price. The service time during which the resource is used
by the customer is stochastic and the firm may incur a service cost. This model represents
various markets for reusable resources such as cloud computing, shared vehicles, rotable
parts, and hotel rooms. In this chapter, we analyze this pricing problem when the firm
attempts to maximize a weighted combination of three central metrics: profit, market share,
and service level. Under Poisson arrivals, exponential service times, and standard assump-
tions on the willingness-to-pay distribution, we establish a series of results that characterize
the performance of static pricing in such environments. In particular, while an optimal pol-
icy is fully dynamic in such a context, we prove that a static pricing policy simultaneously
guarantees 78.9% of the profit, market share, and service level from the optimal policy. No-
tably, this result holds for any service rate and number of units the firm operates. In the
special case where there are two units and the induced demand is linear, we also prove that
the static policy guarantees 95.5% of the profit from the optimal policy. Our numerical
findings on a large testbed of instances suggest that the latter result is quite indicative of
5
the profit obtained by the static pricing policy across all parameters.
1.1 Introduction
In many service industries, the same resource to serve one customer can be used to serve
future customers once the initial service is completed. This type of resource is commonly
referred to as a reusable resource. For instance, in the hotel or car rental industry, a fixed
number of rooms or vehicles are available to accommodate customers. Each customer uses
one of these resources for some number of days until check out or return, after which it is free
to be used by another customer. In a related example, many offices, campuses, or apartment
buildings offer a pool of bicycles or vehicles to be rented or shared by their members, and
units are always returned to their origin after being used by a member. Another example of
a reusable resource is cloud computing servers, which can be used by customers to complete
jobs after which they become available for processing new jobs. Finally, another interesting
example of a reusable resource arises in the repair industry for aircraft, trains, and other large
machinery. Specifically, there is a class of spare parts that are known as rotable, meaning
that when they break, the customer exchanges the broken part for a working part with the
repair agent. When the repair agent receives the broken part, it is “utilized” for some time
as it is being repaired, after which it becomes available again to service potential future
customers.
All of the examples above share several important features which we shall incorporate
into our model. First, the number of units available of each resource is fixed (over appropriate
time horizons), as acquiring more capacity or units involves significant investments. Second,
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when a resource is used, the service time is generally stochastic and varies across customers.
Third, customers are price-sensitive and in turn the demand rate in each of these applications
can be controlled by the price (which can be a one-time fee or an hourly/daily fee to the
customer). Fourth, there is a cost incurred by the service provider associated with the usage
of a unit (e.g., in terms of cleaning, maintenance, or repair). Finally, in each of these settings
it is highly unusual for a customer to wait for service. That is, if all units of the resource
are occupied, the customer is typically lost.
In all of the settings above, the seller may have multiple objectives. The profit rate
is clearly a fundamental objective for any service provider, but typically such providers
also focus significantly on their market share and service level, i.e., the probability that
an arriving customer finds a resource available. The latter two metrics are driven by the
long term objectives of maintaining a prominent position in the market and ensuring that
consumers find the service reliable.
In such environments, an optimal policy will be highly dynamic in general, adjusting
its prices often, as a function of the supply conditions. The question this chapter aims to
address is the following. What is the performance of a simple static pricing (one price)
policy in such environments? This question has dual practical and theoretical motivations.
On the one hand, in practice, dynamic pricing may not be feasible when prices need to
be published in a catalog upfront or may be undesirable due to the negative perception
by customers. On the other hand, the existing literature in dynamic pricing has argued
for particular objectives that static pricing yields near-optimal performance in large-scale
systems (see literature review). How robust is such an insight for a combination of objectives
and for arbitrary scales? (While the scale for cloud computing may be large, it is often small
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as well, e.g., rotable spare parts.) In particular, in this chapter, we aim to derive universal
performance guarantees for static pricing with respect to the profit, market share, and service
level objectives, with an optimal dynamic pricing strategy serving as the benchmark. In
particular, we aim to provide results on the strength of static pricing that hold across all
possible parameter regimes and scales.
To that end, we anchor our analysis around the following prototypical model. A service
provider manages a pool of a single type of reusable resource. The firm uses the reusable
resources to deliver service to customers over an infinite horizon. Customers arrive according
to a Poisson process in which the rate depends on the price set by the firm. We make the
standard assumption that the revenue rate is concave in the arrival rate. Upon arrival, a
customer seizes one unit of the resources for an exponentially distributed random amount
of time and pays a fee (which could depend on the realized duration of usage or be fixed
in advance). The unit of resource occupied by a customer becomes available to others after
service completion. The firm may also incur some cost of service. The goal of the firm is to
decide on the optimal pricing policy to maximize a combination of three different objectives:
profit rate, market share, and service level.
The main contributions of this chapter lie in deriving universal performance guarantees
for static pricing and can be summarized as follows.
• We establish that for any combination of the three objectives – profit rate, market
share, and service level – there exists a static pricing policy which can achieve at least
78.9% of the value of each objective under the optimal dynamic pricing policy. This
result holds for any capacity size, market size, and service rate. Our proof relies on
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constructing an explicit static policy, characterizing a lower bound in terms of the
stock-in probabilities of our policy and the optimal policy, and analyzing this ratio
using a change of variables.
• We consider a special case where the service provider is a profit maximizer, there are
two units of the reusable resource, and the demand rate is linear in the price. We prove
in this case that the static policy achieves at least 95.5% of the optimal profit from
dynamic pricing. This result holds for any market size and service rate. Moreover, this
exact scenario arises frequently in practice in the context of providing (very expensive)
rotable spare parts (Chapter 2).
• We complement the theoretical results above with numerical experiments over a broad
test bed. These illustrate that the performance of static pricing is in general even
better. Furthermore, for profit maximization, we find the performance of static pricing
is always above 97.5% of that obtained by an optimal dynamic pricing policy, indicating
the robustness of the insights derived beyond the exact conditions assumed in the
theorems.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first universal guarantees derived for static
pricing for this class of problems. Furthermore, the bounds derived highlight the very high
performance of static pricing.
1.1.1 Literature review
We next provide an overview of the literature on the effectiveness of static pricing policies in
the context of perishable inventory, queuing systems, and reusable resources. We note that
9
although a server in a queueing system is indeed a reusable resource, these systems typically
allow for customers to wait for service. In contrast, the reusable resources literature assumes
that customers are immediately lost if no units are available.
The dynamic pricing literature has had an extensive focus on the context of perishable
resources, where there is a finite time horizon to consume a finite number of units of one or
more resources (see den Boer (2015) for a recent survey). The seminal work of Gallego and
Van Ryzin (1994) shows that if the revenue function is concave, a static pricing policy loses at
most 1/(2
√
min{C, λ∗t}), where C is the number of units and λ∗t represents the expected
number of sales under the myopic price. The authors also show a universal guarantee of
1 − 1/e for any parameter regime, with both results relying on a concavity assumption on
the revenue rate (see also Ma et al. (2018)). Ma et al. (2018) recently generalize these results
for the same model without the concavity assumption, and also provide non-adaptive pricing
policies for assortment optimization and non-stationary demand settings with constant factor
performance guarantees. Chen et al. (2018) showed that the 1−1/e guarantee and asymptotic
optimality for static pricing also holds in the presence of strategic customers. Gallego et al.
(2008) establish conditions for when static pricing is optimal in the presence of strategic
customers. The value of static over dynamic pricing policies has also been considered in
models with inventory cost and replenishment considerations, such as those in Federgruen
and Heching (1999), Chen et al. (2006), Yin and Rajaram (2007), Chen et al. (2010). Related
to static pricing policies are policies with limited price changes, such as those considered in
Feng and Gallego (1995), Bitran and Mondschein (1997), Netessine (2006), C¸elik et al. (2009),
Chen et al. (2015), Cheung et al. (2017). Note that in our model there are no inventory
costs, and inventory can be repeatedly reused over an infinite time horizon.
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There is also an extensive literature on dynamic pricing in queues. Paschalidis and Tsit-
siklis (2000) provide numerical results showing the promise of static pricing in multi-class
systems. Ata and Shneorson (2006) studied the dynamic pricing of an M/M/1 service system
where the objective is welfare maximization, and numerically show it can have significant
gains over static pricing. Maglaras and Zeevi (2005) showed in a service system, the revenue
generated by the fluid-optimal prices are near optimal when the capacity and market poten-
tial are both large. In a related model where the objective is revenue maximization, with
observable queues, Kim and Randhawa (2017) quantify more precisely the asymptotic value
of dynamic pricing in large systems and prove conditions under which a two price policy
is almost as good as a dynamic pricing policy. Banerjee et al. (2015) provide a queueing
analysis of a ride-share platform where the customers are modeled as servers, and show
that a static price is asymptotically equal to a dynamic price policy for large-scale systems,
although dynamic pricing is more robust to modeling error.
Closest to our formulation is the work of Gans and Savin (2007) who study dynamic
pricing to maximize the expected profit for rentals. Their model considers discounted rewards
with a discrete price ladder, although with multiple customer types. They show the near-
optimality of static pricing in highly utilized rental systems where both the offered load and
system capacity are large. To the best of our knowledge, all of the previously mentioned
results quantifying the gap between static pricing and dynamic pricing hold asymptotically
when the scale of the system is large. In contrast, our results provide universal guarantees
that do not rely on the scale of the system. Recently, Banerjee et al. (2016) consider a
general network of a single type of resource where prices control the rates between nodes,
and prove a guarantee of C/(C + n − 1) for possibly multiple objectives but zero service
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times, where n is the number of nodes and C is the number of units. With non-zero service
times, as we consider in this chapter, a looser guarantee can be provided only when C is
large enough. In this chapter, we provides a guarantee for any number of units, but does
not consider a general network.
Various related studies focus on dynamic heuristics, multiple types of reusable resources,
and other levers beyond pricing. Lei and Jasin (2018) study the dynamic pricing problem
in a setting with deterministic service times and describe policies that are asymptotically
optimal in the regime where demand and resource capacity are both large. Doan, Lei, and
Shen (2019) study the pricing problem of reusable resources under ambiguous distributions
of demand and service time and use robust deterministic approximation models to construct
asymptotic optimal fixed-price policies.
Variants of the assortment optimization problem have been considered in Rusmevichien-
tong, Sumida, and Topaloglu (2017), Owen and Simchi-Levi (2018) and Gong et al. (2019)
with various universal approximation guarantees. The results in the first two papers can
be extended to allow for dynamic pricing with discrete price points. Iyengar, Sigman et al.
(2004) and Levi and Radovanovic´ (2010) use linear programming approaches to design ad-
mission control policies for such systems, which is a special case of dynamic pricing where a
resource is either priced at a nominal price or at infinity. Their admission control policies are
asymptotically optimal, and Levi and Radovanovic´ (2010) also provides a universal guaran-
tee of 1/2. Chen, Levi, and Shi (2017) and Chen and Shi (2018) consider generalizations of
this model that permit advanced reservations and strategic customers, respectively.
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1.1.2 Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we describe the model along with
structural properties of the optimal policy. In Section 1.3, we prove the 78.9% performance
guarantee of static pricing under our multi-objective setting for any parameter range. We
then refine our guarantee to 95.5% in Section 1.4 for the special case of profit maximization
with two units under linear demand. We conduct numerical experiments in Section 1.5 that
show that the actual performance of static pricing is even stronger than our guarantee, and
that such performance still holds when the exact assumptions of the theoretical results do
not hold.
1.2 Model and Preliminaries
In this section, we first describe a general model for pricing a reusable resource. We then
describe the various performance objectives the service provider may use, followed by several
important properties of the optimal dynamic pricing policy.
1.2.1 Pricing model for a reusable resource
We consider a model in which a service provider has a fixed number of identical, non-
perishable units of a reusable resource that are sold to price-sensitive customers. The total
number of units of the reusable resource that the provider has is C. At any point in time,
each unit of the resource is either available for sale or occupied. Note that an occupied unit
can be interpreted as a customer using the unit in the cloud computing and ride sharing
examples, or being repaired in the rotable spare parts example from Section 1.1.
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Customers arrive to the system over time according to a Poisson process with rate Λ > 0.
Each customer has an i.i.d. willingness-to-pay drawn from a valuation distribution F . When
a customer arrives, the provider offers a unit at some price p, and a customer decides
to purchase usage of the resource if their willingness to pay exceeds p. We denote by
λ(p) := ΛF¯ (p) the effective arrival rate at price p. When a customer decides to purchase
usage, one unit is then occupied for a random amount of time that follows an exponential
distribution with mean 1/µ. We assume that the usage times are i.i.d. across customers and
independent of the customer valuations.
While a unit is being occupied, the firm cannot sell that unit until it is returned to the
system, i.e., a customer finishes using the unit or the provider finishes repairing the unit.
The firm incurs a cost c to service one customer, which may be a cleaning, maintenance, or
repair cost. Any customer that arrives when all units are occupied is lost, regardless of the
current price being offered. This assumption is largely motivated by the fact that in most
of our applications the customers are seeking immediate service, and would naturally seek
out a competitor if the provider has no units available.
We assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between prices and effective arrival
rates so that λ(p) has a unique inverse, denoted by p(λ). Therefore, one can view the
effective arrival rate λ as the decision variable. The firm dynamically determines a target
effective arrival rate λ which can be realized with the corresponding price p(λ). From an
analysis perspective, the effective arrival rate is more convenient to work with. We shall
make the standard assumption in the revenue management literature that the profit rate
function λ(p(λ)− c) is concave in λ.
The set of admissible policies, Π, is the set of non-anticipating policies, i.e., policies such
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that the effective arrival rate at time t, λ(t), may only depend on events up to t−. We shall
also be interested in the class of static policies, Πs ⊂ Π, that simply fix a single arrival rate
λ (price) at every time t.
1.2.2 Performance metrics
One natural metric when selling the reusable resources is the expected profit rate. Fix a
pricing policy pi and let λ(t) denote the corresponding effective arrival rate at time t. Let
Npi(t) denote the corresponding arrival process. Note that the latter is a non-stationary
Poisson process with intensity λ(t). Let Qpi(t) denote the number of on-hand units at time
t. The long-run average profit rate Ppi is given by







1{Qpi(t) > 0}(p(λ(t))− c)dNpi(t)
]
. (1.1)
For simplicity in the exposition of this chapter, we assume p(λ(t)) is a one-time fee a user
pays for the service. Note that the analysis presented easily generalizes to the case when a
user’s payment depends on usage time, i.e., it is equivalent to charge a one-time price that
is simply the price per time unit multiplied by the expected usage time.
While the firm wants to maximize its profit, it may also want to keep a certain level
of market share, i.e., the expected number of units sold, as well as a certain service level.
The market share objectiveMSpi is directly aligned with maximizing sales, while the service
level objective SLpi is measured by the fraction of time at least one unit is available. These
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two objectives can be represented as
















Note that there is a trade-off between the various metrics; the optimal solution for one
objective will generally be sub-optimal for another. For instance, maximizing the service
level corresponds to setting a static price as large as possible, while maximizing market share
corresponds to setting a static price of zero. Clearly neither price will result in any profit at
all.
In order to take the different objectives into account simultaneously, we assume the firm
maximizes a weighted combination of the objectives,
α1Ppi + α2MSpi + α3SLpi, (1.2)
where α1, α2, α3 ≥ 0 are the weights placed on each objective by the service provider. With-
out loss of generality, we assume α1 + α2 + α3 = 1. We let V
∗ denote the long-run value
under the optimal policy, and is thus defined by
V ∗ := sup
pi∈Π
{α1Ppi + α2MSpi + α3SLpi} . (1.3)
We denote by pi∗ an optimal policy. Similarly, we let V s denote the long-run value under
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the optimal static policy, and is thus defined by
V s := sup
pi∈Πs
{α1Ppi + α2MSpi + α3SLpi} . (1.4)
In this chapter, we focus on universal performance guarantees for static pricing. In
particular, we shall focus on the worst-case performance of the optimal static pricing policy
in comparison to the optimal dynamic policy. That is, we seek to characterize the maximum
possible loss over all possible instances of our model. Formally, we let Ω denote the family
of instances
Ω := {(C, µ, p(·), c, α1, α2, α3) :
C ∈ N+, c, µ > 0, α1 + α2 + α3 = 1, αi ≥ 0, λ(p(λ)− c) concave in λ}.






which is the ratio between the objectives under the optimal static and dynamic pricing
policies. In fact, we shall show that our bound applies to the corresponding ratios of each
of the three objectives.
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1.2.3 Analysis of the benchmark V ∗
We shall now characterize the structure of an optimal solution to the dynamic pricing prob-
lem stated in Equation (1.3). Given the Poisson assumption on arrivals and the exponen-
tial assumption on service times, without loss of optimality, one may focus on stationary
policies that update the price only at changes in the number of units on-hand. The memo-
ryless property of the exponential distribution allows us to fully characterize the system (a
continuous-time Markov chain) by the number of units on-hand. As we shall see, this allows
us to provide closed-form expressions for the steady state distribution and objectives under
a particular policy.
An admissible policy pi may be represented by C arrival rates λ1, . . . λC . When the
provider has only i units available, the price is set to p(λi). Note that the static policy is a
special case where λ1 = . . . = λC . Furthermore, the system can now be modeled as a birth-
death process where each state represents the number of units available. The transition rate
from state i to i+ 1 is (C − i)µ for i = 0, . . . , C − 1. The transition rate from i to i− 1 is λi















, i = 0, . . . , C.













Pi(pi) = 1− P0(pi). (1.7)
Let us denote by λ∗i the effective arrival rate in state i under the optimal policy, and by P∗i
the steady-state probabilities of being in state i under the optimal policy. In Lemma 1.2.1,
we show a fundamental property that effective arrival rates are decreasing as the number
of units available increases. Moreover, all such arrival rates do not exceed the myopic rate
λ¯ (the rate only maximizes the immediate reward without considering the future), which
yields the highest possible instantaneous objective rate.
Lemma 1.2.1. Let λ∗i be the optimal arrival rate when the on-hand inventory level is i. Let
λ¯ denote the myopic arrival rate where λ¯ = arg maxλ λ(α1(p(λ)− c) + α2). Then
λ¯ ≥ λ∗C ≥ · · · ≥ λ∗1. (1.8)
The proof of Lemma 1.2.1 can be found in Section 1.6. Notice that the result presented
in Lemma 1.2.1 shares the same structural property as presented in Theorem 1 in Gans and
Savin (2007) where the objective is only profit maximization in a discounted reward setting.
We extend the analysis to a long-run average reward setting with multiple objectives and
prove that monotonicity of optimal prices (and rates) still holds. We will make use of this
property in the subsequent analysis.
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1.3 Static Pricing Guarantee for Multi-Objective
Optimization
We next investigate the performance of static pricing and present our first main result.
Theorem 1.3.1. There exists a static pricing policy pis that guarantees at least 15
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of the profit














Theorem 1.3.1 provides a strong guarantee: there exists a static price that nearly ap-
proximates the performance of an optimal dynamic pricing policy. Specifically, this price
guarantees that the profit rate, market share, and service level are at least 15
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≈ .789 of the
corresponding values under the dynamic pricing policy. Of course, a direct consequence of
Theorem 1.3.1 is that the optimal single price will have an overall objective of at least 0.789
of the objective under the optimal dynamic pricing policy as well. It is important to note
that our result makes no assumption on the number of units in the system, demand rate,
or service rate. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature which require the system
usage and capacity to be large to provide theoretical guarantees.
It is worthwhile to note that our proof is constructive and exhibits a particular static
price that yields such performance. The static price behind our major finding is constructed
using the optimal policy, which we denote by pi∗. Recall that λ∗i are the arrival rates under
the optimal policy and P∗i are the steady-state probabilities. The single price is simply chosen
so that the corresponding arrival rate, λ˜, is the same as the expected arrival rate under the
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Our proof, that we detail in the next subsection exploits this structure, together with the
structure of the underlying birth and death process, to derive a universal guarantee.
1.3.1 Proof of Theorem 1.3.1
The proof is organized around two main steps. In the first step, we exploit the concavity
of the revenue rate function (in the quantity space) to establish that for each of the three
objectives, the ratio of the performances under the static and optimal policies is at least the
ratio of the corresponding service levels. The second step bounds the ratio of the service levels
by 15/19 by enumerating several cases, with each case proven using elementary calculus. A
key component of this second step is a change of variables from demand rates to the product
of demand rates. Both steps fundamentally exploit the explicit construction of λ˜ in Eq.
(1.9). With some abuse of notation, we index quantities with λ˜ to denote these under the
static policy induced by this static rate.




































































The first equality follow from Eq. (1.5). The inequality follows from the fact that the function
λ(p(λ)− c) is concave in λ and applying Jensen’s inequality to a random variable that takes
value λ∗i with probability
P∗i
1−P∗0 for i = 1, . . . , C. Note that the expected value of this random
variable is exactly λ˜ by Eq. (1.9). We next characterize the stock-in probabilities, and the
remainder of the proof, in terms of the new z variables. This variable transformation unlocks
the ability to apply (many) basic calculus ideas to prove our lower bound.
Step 2. To find the lower bound of the ratio of stock-in probabilities, we define a set of
auxiliary notation which will be useful in our subsequent analysis. We define ai :=
C!
(C−i)! for





for i = 1, . . . , C + 1. For clarity, note that zC+1 = 1. We
also define x :=
∑C




Using the steady-state probabilities derived in Section 1.2.3 and the definition of λ˜, the



















From the above, it is clear that the ratio of the service levels may be written as a function
of z1, . . . , zC . We call this function R(z1, . . . , zC). Formally,
























We next develop a uniform lower bound on R(z1, · · · , zC) by developing separate bounds
for the cases where C is small (C ≤ 3) or large (C ≥ 4).
Step 2a. We prove the lower bound for the cases where C is at most 3. When C = 1,
then λ˜ = λ∗1 and therefore R(z1) = 1. When C = 2, we have
R(z1, z2) =
z21 + 4z1z2 + 3z1 + 4z
2
2 + 6z2 + 2
z21 + 4z1z2 + 2z1 + 5z
2




where the inequality follows by matching terms and looking at the minimum ratio. When
C = 3, the numerator of R(z1, z2, z3) is
48 + 192z3 + 120z2 + 32z1 + 264z
2
3 + 336z2z3 + 96z1z3 + 108z
2























while the denominator of R(z1, z2, z3) is
48 + 192z3 + 120z2 + 24z1 + 264z
2
3 + 336z2z3 + 72z1z3 + 108z
2






















By matching terms in the numerator and denominator, it is then clear that






Step 2b. Next, we consider the case where C ≥ 4. While the function ratio R(·) is
difficult to analyze directly, we will derive a lower bound on R, which we denote by R˜(·),
which will be amenable to analysis. The bound can be derived simply by observing that



















































































=: R˜(z1, . . . , zC).
Next, we derive a lower bound on R˜(·) though two subcases, depending on the ratio of y
to z1. We first establish in Lemma 1.3.1 (proved in Section 1.6) that the partial derivative
with respect to the first argument is non-negative as long as y ≥ a1z1.
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When y ≥ a1z1, Lemma 1.3.1 implies that the worst case value of R˜ occurs when z1 = 0.
In turn, in Lemma 1.3.2 (proved in Section 1.6), we establish a uniform lower bound on
R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC).
Lemma 1.3.2. Fix C ≥ 4. For all z2, ..., zC ∈ [0,∞)C−1, we have
R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) ≥ 104
131
.
From Lemmas 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, we can conclude that when y ≥ a1z1, then
R˜(z1, z2, . . . , zC) ≥ R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) ≥ 104131 .
If y ≤ a1z1, then there is no guarantee on the derivative, but one may directly establish
a uniform lower bound on R˜ as articulated in Lemma 1.3.3 (proved in Section 1.6).
Lemma 1.3.3. Fix C ≥ 4 and suppose y ≤ a1z1, then
R˜(z1, z2, . . . , zC) ≥ 6
7
.
Combining both cases, We conclude that









This completes the proof of Theorem 1.3.1.
1.3.2 Tightness of analysis
We present an example which shows that the lower bound of 15
19
in Theorem 1.3.1 can be
tight for a family of instances. That is, we shall describe instances in which the static policy
we construct, λ˜, achieves exactly a fraction 15/19 of the optimal dynamic policy. Namely,




Since α3 = 1, then the objective is to maximize the service level, that is
max
pi
SLpi = 1− P(pi).





































Now let us consider the static policy λ˜ which we construct according to Eq. (1.9). Recall
from Section 1.3.1 that the performance of the static pricing policy with respect to the






the performance of the static pricing policy with respect to the profit rate is also R(z1, z2, z3)
because λ(p(λ) − c) is linear in λ if p(λ) = 1
λ
, which makes the Jensen’s inequality tight in
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the derivation of Eq. (1.12). Since z1 = 0, then the ratio becomes
R(z1, z2, z3)
=
48 + 192z3 + 120z2 + 264z
2





























, we have z3 →∞ and z3 = o(z2) as µ→ 0, and hence
lim
µ→0







1.4 Sharpening the Bound for Profit Maximization
In this section, we seek to focus more deeply on the profit maximization objective corre-
sponding to α1 = 1. This objective is central in the literature and we aim to understand to
what extent can our 78.9% guarantee from Section 1.3 be improved.
Theorem 1.4.1. Fix C = 2, and consider any rate µ and linear demand function λ(·). Let




This result establishes that for profit maximization, a simple static pricing policy guaran-
tees more than 95.5% of an optimal dynamic pricing policy. This is a much higher guarantee
than for the general multi-objective case. In particular, for profit maximization, there is
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extremely limited value in dynamic pricing.
We note that due to the technical difficulty of the analysis, our result is limited to the
case with only 2 units (C = 2), and when the demand is linear (p(·) and λ(·) are linear),
a common assumption in both the literature and practice. However, in Section 1.5, we will
see numerically that the level of guarantee above is valid beyond the case C = 2 and linear
demand. In fact, our computational results shows that the 95.5% lower bound holds across
all possible instances considered in this chapter.
The proof of Theorem 1.4.1 is again constructive in that it exhibits a particular static
policy with such a guarantee. This policy is the same as the one presented in Eq (1.9).
The proof relies on lower bounding the ratio of the service levels, which is indeed a lower
bound on the profit ratio as seen in Eq. (1.12). Then, the first order conditions of the profit
maximization objective are used to impose constraints on the worst-case arrival rates of an
optimal policy, which allows us to find a tighter bound on the ratio of the service levels.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 1.4.1. Let λ∗1, λ
∗
2 be the effective arrival rates under the optimal
policy for profit maximization, and p∗1, p
∗















z21 + 4z1z2 + 3z1 + 4z
2
2 + 6z2 + 2
z21 + 4z1z2 + 2z1 + 5z
2
2 + 6z2 + 2
:= R(z1, z2).
Next, we show that R(z1, z2) is increasing in z1 and decreasing in z2 by simply looking
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−z21 + 2z1z22 + 4z32 + 7z22 + 6z2 + 2
(z21 + 4z1z2 + 2z1 + 5z
2







1(z2 + 2) + z1(2z
2
2 + 7z2 + 3) + z2(3z2 + 2))
(z21 + 4z1z2 + 2z1 + 5z
2
2 + 6z2 + 2)
2
≤ 0.
To see that the partial derivative w.r.t. z1 is non-negative, it is sufficient to show that
z1 ≤ z22 , which follows from the fact that λ∗1 ≤ λ∗2, established in Lemma 1.2.1. To see that
the partial derivative w.r.t. z2 is non-positive, observe that all terms in the numerator are
negative.









, then in this case





since R(z1, z2) is increasing in z1 and decreasing in z2.




. In this case, we
leverage the first-order optimality conditions of the problem to show in Lemma 1.4.1 that
z1 and z2 must be within a provable quantity of one another. This constraint then allows us
to tighten the lower bound on R(·). Denote γi = −p′(λi). Notice that since the demand is
linear, then γ1 = γ2. Define β :=
p∗1−c
γ1
≥ 0, and now we are ready to state the bounds on z1
and z2 in Lemma 1.4.1 (proved in Section 1.6).
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Lemma 1.4.1. Let g(β, z2) =
√
(z2 + 1)2 + βz2(z2 + 2)− (z2 + 1). Then




By Lemma 1.4.1 and the fact that R(z1, z2) is non-decreasing in z1 we have that
R(z1, z2) ≥ R(g(β, z2), z2)
=
(2 + β)z22 + (2β + 3)z2 + (2z2 + 1)
√
(1 + β)z22 + 2(1 + β)z2 + 1 + 1
(3 + β)z22 + (2β + 4)z2 + 2z2
√
(1 + β)z22 + 2(1 + β)z2 + 1 + 2
= 1− z
2
2 + z2 + 1−
√
(1 + β)z22 + 2(1 + β)z2 + 1
(3 + β)z22 + (2β + 4)z2 + 2z2
√
(1 + β)z22 + 2(1 + β)z2 + 1 + 2
:= 1−G(β, z2). (1.15)
Therefore, minimizing R(z1, z2) is equivalent to maximizing G(β, z2), for which we provide
an upper bound in Lemma 1.4.2 (proved in Section 1.6).




and β ≥ 0, then G(β, z2) ≤ 0.0433.




, Eq. (1.15) and Lemma 1.4.2 imply that
R(z1, z2) ≥ 1−G(β, z2) ≥ 1− 0.0433 = 0.9567.
Combining both cases, we obtain the claimed result and the proof is complete.
30
1.5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we conduct a set of numerical experiments to test the performance of the
static pricing policy. We consider three types of demand functions: linear, exponential,
and logistic. For a linear demand curve, we assume it takes the form λ = −ap + b; for an
exponential demand curve, we assume it follows λ = be−ap; for the logistic demand curve, we
assume it is λ = b(1+e
−ap0 )
1+ea(p−p0)
where p0 is the inflection point. Notice that in all three demand
curves, the maximum demand rate is set to be b when the price is set to 0.
For each value of C, we randomly generate the mean usage time uniformly in 1
µ
∈
[0.05, 50]; a is randomly generated uniformly between 0.1 and 5; b is randomly generated
uniformly between 0.5 and 10; p0 is randomly generated uniformly between [0,20]. We assume
that the average service cost is 0, i.e., c = 0. We generate 1,000 different instances of inputs
and calculate the profit rate under the optimal dynamic pricing policy, the constructed static
price policy λ˜ according to Eq. (1.9), and the best static price policy pis
∗
. We report the





Ppi∗ for each capacity level C. The results are summarized in Table
1.1.
As one can observe, the performance of static pricing is generally higher than 97.5%.
When C = 2, we observe the worst case to be 99.53% in the case of linear demand, which
is even higher than the 95.5% guarantee proven in Theorem 1.4.1. We also note that this
very high performance of static prices continues to hold when we depart from the exact
assumptions of Theorem 1.4.1, for general values of C and for exponential and logistic
demand curves.



















2 99.53% 99.54% 99.06% 99.07% 99.16% 99.18%
3 99.27% 99.28% 98.57% 98.60% 98.68% 98.72%
4 99.10% 99.12% 98.26% 98.31% 98.41% 98.46%
5 98.97% 99.00% 98.05% 98.11% 98.19% 98.28%
10 98.66% 98.71% 97.58% 97.70% 97.71% 97.84%
20 98.46% 98.55% 97.38% 97.56% 97.46% 97.70%
30 98.40% 98.51% 97.39% 97.57% 97.45% 97.68%
40 98.38% 98.51% 97.48% 97.62% 97.51% 97.72%
50 98.37% 98.51% 97.60% 97.69% 97.58% 97.79%
Table 1.1: Worst case profit ratio: static pricing policies vs. optimal dynamic pricing policy.
the price we construct) does not happen when C = 2. However, the ratio of the profit rate
achieved by the static policy and the optimal profit rate appears to be relatively independent
of the value of C. Of course, as C approaches infinity, the worst case ratio indeed converges
to 1.
In addition, one may observe that the performance of the static price policy we con-
structed in the proofs is very close to the performance of the best static price for profit
maximization. The difference of the worst case performance between the two static prices is
usually less than 0.2%.
Using a similar testbed, we also conducted numerical experiments for the multi-objective
case. We use the linear demand model in the numerical experiment and randomly generate
the values of αi’s uniformly at random. The rest of the experiment settings are the same as
described before. We calculate the worst case performance of our constructed static price
compared to the total objective as well as for the three performance metrics. The results
are presented in Table 1.2.











2 81.08% 84.70% 81.03% 81.03%
3 80.32% 83.85% 80.23% 80.23%
4 80.95% 84.45% 80.82% 80.82%
5 81.80% 85.27% 81.63% 81.63%
10 85.37% 88.67% 85.02% 85.02%
15 87.68% 90.79% 87.17% 87.17%
20 89.30% 92.22% 88.67% 88.67%
Table 1.2: Performance of static pricing with multiple objectives.
at 80.32% for the overall objectives, and 80.23% for the market share and service level
objectives. For this worst case ratio, the values of αi’s are similar to the construction in our
tightness example where α3 is very close to 1 while α1 and α2 is close to 0. This finding is
consistent with our tightness analysis.
1.6 Additional proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.2.1. We prove this lemma by transforming the continuous time
Markov Decision Process (MDP) to a discrete time MDP and showing that the value iteration
operator preserve concavity and monotonicity.
Using standard techniques (see, e.g., Bertsekas (2012)), the continuous time MDP associ-
ated to Equation (1.3) can be transformed into a discrete time MDP, through uniformization,
and solved efficiently using value iteration. Let γ be given by
γ =
1
1 + Λ + Cµ
,
where Λ is the maximum demand rate. Note that 1 + Λ + Cµ upper bounds the transition
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rates from any state in the Markov Chain.
Let h(i) denote the relative, long-run expected reward associated with having i units
available and η be the optimal average profit. The value iteration operator, T , takes the
following form,
T h(i) = max
λ∈[0,Λ]
{α1λ(p(λ)− c) + α2λ+ α3 − η+
γλh(i− 1) + γµ(C − i)h(i+ 1) + (1− γ(λ+ µ(C − i))h(i))} ∀i (1.16)
where
h(0) = 0.
Letting h∗(i) denote the relative optimal expected reward of having i units available,
then h∗(i) = lim
n→∞
T nh(i). We next prove the fact that h∗(i) is nondecreasing and concave
by showing T h(i) is nondecreasing and concave if h(i) has the same properties.
For any state i, we can rewrite the value iteration presented in Equation (1.16) as follows:




[α1λ(p(λ)− c) + α2λ+ γλh(i− 1) + γ(1 + Λ− λ)h(i)] ,
B(i) = γµ [(C − i)h(i+ 1) + ih(i)]− η + α3.
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Denote
λi = arg maxA(i)
In order to show T h(i) is nondecreasing and concave, we will show both A(i) and B(i) are
nondecreasing and concave.
To show that A(i) is nondecreasing in i, observe that
A(i)− A(i− 1) = A(i)|λi − A(i− 1)|λi−1
≥ A(i)|λi−1 − A(i− 1)|λi−1
= γλi−1 [h(i− 1)− h(i− 2)] + γ(1 + Λ− λi−1) [h(i)− h(i− 1)]
≥ 0.
The first inequality comes from the fact that λi is the maximizer of A(i). The last inequality
comes from the assumption that h(·) is nondecreasing.
To show that B(i) in nondecreasing in i, observe that
B(i)−B(i− 1) = γµ ((C − i)h(i+ 1) + ih(i)− (C − i+ 1)h(i)− (i− 1)h(i− 1))
= γµ ((C − i) [h(i+ 1)− h(i)] + (i− 1) [h(i)− h(i− 1)])
≥ 0,
since h(·) is nondecreasing and both γ and µ are positive.
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To establish the concavity of A(i), observe that
A(i− 1) + A(i+ 1)− 2A(i)
= A(i− 1)|λi−1 + A(i+ 1)|λi+1 − 2A(i)|λi
≤ A(i− 1)|λi−1 + A(i+ 1)|λi+1 − A(i)|λi−1 − A(i)|λi+1
= γλ(λi−1)h(i− 2) + γ(1 + Λ− λi−1)h(i− 1) + λi+1h(i) + γ(1 + Λ− λi+1)h(i+ 1)
− λi−1h(i− 1) + γ(1 + Λ− λi−1)h(i)− λi+1h(i− 1) + γ(1 + Λ− λi+1)h(i)
= γλi−1 [h(i− 2) + h(i)− 2h(i− 1)] + γ(1 + Λ) [h(i− 1) + h(i+ 1)− 2h(i)]
+ γλi+1 [2h(i)− h(i− 1)− h(i+ 1)]
= γλi−1 [h(i− 2) + h(i)− 2h(i− 1)] + γ(1 + Λ− λi+1) [h(i− 1) + h(i+ 1)− 2h(i)]
≤ 0.
The first inequality follows from the fact that λi is the maximizer of A(i). Since Λ is the
maximum rate of customer arrivals, then 1 + Λ − λi+1 is positive and the last inequality
follows from the concavity of h(·).
To establish the concavity of B(i), observe that
B(i− 1) +B(i+ 1)− 2B(i) = γµ [(C − (i− 1))h(i) + (i− 1)h(i− 1)]
+ γµ [(C − (i+ 1))h(i+ 2) + (i+ 1)h(i+ 1)]
− γµ [2(C − i)h(i+ 1)− 2ih(i)]
= γµ [(i− 1) [h(i− 1) + h(i+ 1)− 2h(i)]]
+ γµ [(C − i− 1) [h(i+ 2) + h(i)− 2h(i+ 1)]]
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≤ 0.
The last inequality follows from the assumption that h(·) is concave and the fact that both
γ and µ are positive.
Recall from Equation (1.16), the optimal prices can be solved using the following equa-
tion,
λ∗i = arg max
λ
λ[α1(p(λ)− c) + α2 − γ(h∗(i)− h∗(i− 1)].
Given the nondecreasing and concave properties of h∗(·), we can conclude the desired prop-
erty of the optimal policy.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1. The proof follows by simply showing that ∂R˜(z1,...,zC)
∂z1
≥ 0, which
is equivalent to showing that the numerator of ∂R˜(z1,...,zC)
∂z1
is non-negative. To do this, we
first establish a few facts.









































where the second inequality follows from Eq. (1.17).
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Under the assumption of y ≥ a1z1 and the fact that y ≤ (C − 1)x, we also have that
x ≥ z1, (1.19)
x ≥ a1z1 + y
2(C − 1) . (1.20)
Using the definitions of x and y, we may rewrite R˜(·) as
R˜(z1, . . . , zC) =
(a0z1 + x)[a1(a1z1 + y)
3 + a2(a1z1 + y)
2x+ a3(a1z1 + y)x
2 + a4x
3]
a0(a1z1 + y)4 + a1(a1z1 + y)3x+ a2(a1z1 + y)2x2 + a3(a1z1 + y)x3 + a4x4
.
The derivative of the numerator of R˜(z1, . . . , zC)is
[(a1z1 + y)
4 + a1(a1z1 + y)
3x+ a2(a1z1 + y)




2(z1 + x) + 2a1a2(a1z1 + y)(z1 + x)x+ a1a3(z1 + x)x
2
+ a1(a1z1 + y)
3 + a2(a1z1 + y)
2x+ a3(a1z1 + y)x
2 + a4x
3]
− [a1(a1z1 + y)3(z1 + x) + a2(a1z1 + y)2(z1 + x)x
+ a3(a1z1 + y)(z1 + x)x
2 + a4(z1 + x)x
3]×
[4a1(a1z1 + y)
3 + 3a21(a1z1 + y)




6(z1 + x) + 2a1a2(a1z1 + y)
5(z1 + x)x+ a1a3(a1z1 + y)
4(z1 + x)x
2
+ a1(a1z1 + y)
7 + a2(a1z1 + y)
6x+ a3(a1z1 + y)
5x2 + a4(a1z1 + y)
4x3
+ 3a31(a1z1 + y)




2 + a21a3(a1z1 + y)
3(z1 + x)x
3
+ a21(a1z1 + y)
6x+ a1a2(a1z1 + y)
5x2 + a1a3(a1z1 + y)
4x3 + a1a4(a1z1 + y)
3x4
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3 + a1a2a3(a1z1 + y)
2(z1 + x)x
4
+ a1a2(a1z1 + y)
5x2 + a22(a1z1 + y)
4x3 + a2a3(a1z1 + y)
3x4 + a2a4(a1z1 + y)
2x5
+ 3a21a3(a1z1 + y)
3(z1 + x)x




3(a1z1 + y)(z1 + x)x
5
+ a1a3(a1z1 + y)
4x3 + a2a3(a1z1 + y)
3x4 + a23(a1z1 + y)
2x5 + a3a4(a1z1 + y)x
6
+ 3a21a4(a1z1 + y)
2(z1 + x)x
4 + 2a1a2a4(a1z1 + y)(z1 + x)x
5 + a1a3a4(z1 + x)x
6
+ a1a4(a1z1 + y)
3x4 + a2a4(a1z1 + y)
2x5 + a3a4(a1z1 + y)x
6 + a24x
7
− 4a21(a1z1 + y)6(z1 + x)− 3a31(a1z1 + y)5(z1 + x)x− 2a21a2(a1z1 + y)4(z1 + x)x2
− a21a3(a1z1 + y)3(z1 + x)x3 − 4a1a2(a1z1 + y)5(z1 + x)x− 3a21a2(a1z1 + y)4(z1 + x)x2
− 2a1a22(a1z1 + y)3(z1 + x)x3 − a1a2a3(a1z1 + y)2(z1 + x)x4 − 4a1a3(a1z1 + y)4(z1 + x)x2
− 3a21a3(a1z1 + y)3(z1 + x)x3 − 2a1a2a3(a1z1 + y)2(z1 + x)x4 − a1a23(a1z1 + y)(z1 + x)x5
− 4a1a4(a1z1 + y)3(z1 + x)x3 − 3a21a4(a1z1 + y)2(z1 + x)x4
− 2a1a2a4(a1z1 + y)(z1 + x)x5 − a1a3a4(z1 + x)x6
=3a21(a1z1 + y)








2 + a1(a1z1 + y)




+ [a3 + 2a1a2](a1z1 + y)
5x2 + [a4 + a
2
2 + 2a1a3](a1z1 + y)
4x3




3 + [2a1a4 + 2a2a3](a1z1 + y)
3x4










3 + 2a1a2a4](a1z1 + y)(z1 + x)x
5 + 2a3a4(a1z1 + y)x
6 + a1a3a4(z1 + x)x
6 + a24x
7
− 4a21(a1z1 + y)6(z1 + x)− [3a31 + 4a1a2](a1z1 + y)5(z1 + x)x
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− [5a21a2 + 4a1a3](a1z1 + y)4(z1 + x)x2 − [4a21a3 + 2a1a22 + 4a1a4](a1z1 + y)3(z1 + x)x3
− [3a1a2a3 + 3a21a4](a1z1 + y)2(z1 + x)x4 − [a1a23 + 2a1a2a4](a1z1 + y)(z1 + x)x5
− a1a3a4(z1 + x)x6
=a1(a1z1 + y)
7 + [a2 + a
2
1](a1z1 + y)
6x+ [a3 + 2a1a2](a1z1 + y)
5x2
+ [a4 + a
2
2 + 2a1a3](a1z1 + y)
4x3 + [2a1a4 + 2a2a3](a1z1 + y)
3x4
+ [2a2a4 + a
2
3](a1z1 + y)
2x5 + 2a3a4(a1z1 + y)x
6 + a24x
7
− a21(a1z1 + y)6(z1 + x)− 2a1a2(a1z1 + y)5(z1 + x)x− 3a1a3(a1z1 + y)4(z1 + x)x2
− 4a1a4(a1z1 + y)3(z1 + x)x3
=a1(a1z1 + y)
7 + a2(a1z1 + y)
6x+ a3(a1z1 + y)
5x2 + [a4 + a
2
2 − a1a3](a1z1 + y)4x3
+ [2a2a3 − 2a1a4](a1z1 + y)3x4 + [2a2a4 + a23](a1z1 + y)2x5 + 2a3a4(a1z1 + y)x6 + a24x7
− a21(a1z1 + y)6z1 − 2a1a2(a1z1 + y)5z1x− 3a1a3(a1z1 + y)4z1x2 − 4a1a4(a1z1 + y)3z1x3
=a1y(a1z1 + y)
6 + a2y(a1z1 + y)
5x+ a3y(a1z1 + y)
4x2 + [a4 + a
2
2 − a1a3]y(a1z1 + y)3x3
+ [2a2a3 − 2a1a4](a1z1 + y)3x4 + [2a2a4 + a23](a1z1 + y)2x5 + 2a3a4(a1z1 + y)x6 + a24x7
− a1a2(a1z1 + y)5z1x− 2a1a3(a1z1 + y)4z1x2 − [3a1a4 − a1a22 + a21a3](a1z1 + y)3z1x3
≥a1a2(a1z1 + y)5z1x+ a22(a1z1 + y)4z1x2 + a1a3(a1z1 + y)4z1x2
+ [a1a4 + a1a
2














− a1a2(a1z1 + y)5z1x− 2a1a3(a1z1 + y)4z1x2 − [3a1a4 − a1a22 + a21a3](a1z1 + y)3z1x3
≥0.
The first equality follows from expanding the products completely. The second equality
follows from combining positive terms, and then the negative terms. The third equality
follows from canceling terms out. The fourth equality follows from expanding (z1 +x) terms
and simplifying. The fifth equality follows form expanding (a1z1 + y) in some of the positive
terms and simplifying. The first inequality follows from lower bounding some terms using
y ≥ a1z1, Eq. (1.18), Eq. (1.19), or Eq. (1.20). The second inequality follows since
a22 = C








2(C − 1) +
a3a4











2(C − 1) +
a3a4
2(C − 1)2
=C2(6 + C(6C − 13))
>0
when C ≥ 4.
41
Proof of Lemma 1.3.2. Recall that






The main idea in proving this lemma is to compare the ratio of the coefficient of every
term in R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC). First, we restrict our focus only to the ratio of the coefficients for
the terms when y4 is expanded, since the ratio of the coefficients terms not in y4 is 1. To see
the fact that every term not in y4 has the same value of coefficient in both the numerator
and denominator, we can rewrite R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) as














4−ixi appears in both
numerator and denominator, then the ratio of the coefficient of the terms not in y4 must
be 1. Since R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) ≤ 1 by definition, we only need to focus on the ratio of the
coefficient of the terms in y4 to find the lower bound of R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC).
We now calculate a lower bound on the ratio of the coefficients for the y4 terms. By the
definition of y =
∑C
k=2 akzk, every term in y
4 takes the form: zk22 · · · zkCC where
∑C
i=2 ki =
4, ki ∈ N. Therefore, a combination (k2, . . . , kC) uniquely defines a term in y4. For i =
1, . . . , 4, we use the set Si to select possible ways of choosing terms from y and x, and is
defined as
Si = {k′, k′′ :
C∑
j=2











Now let A(k2, . . . , kC) denote the coefficient of the term defined by (k2, . . . , kC) in the nu-
merator and B(k2, . . . , kC) denote the coefficient of that term in the denominator. Plugging
in y =
∑C
k=2 akzk and x =
∑C
k=1 akzk+1 into R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC), we have that


















(C − j + 1)!
)k′′j ]
B(k2, . . . , kC) =
4!







+ A(k2, . . . , kC).













R˜(z2, . . . , zC) ≥ min A(k2, . . . , kC)
B(k2, . . . , kC)
= min





















F (k2, . . . , kC) + 1
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where









A(k2, . . . , kC)
.
To find the minimum of A(k2,...,kN )
B(k2,...,kN )
is equivalent to finding the maximum of F (k2, . . . , kC).
We next show that for C ≥ 4, F (k2, . . . , kC) is upper bounded by 27104 . First, we show
F (k2, . . . , kC) is maximized when k2 = 4 and ki = 0,∀i = 3, . . . , C. This corresponds to the
term z42 . To see this, observe that









































































The first equality is by the definition of F (k2, . . . , kC). The first inequality holds since for any
i, the maximum possible ratio of the product terms in the numerator and the denominator
is (C − 1)i. The second equality follows by multiplying the numerator and denominator by
(C − 1)4. The third equality follows by dividing the numerator and denominator by 4!
k2!···kC ! .
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k′′2 !···k′′C ! and
4!
k2!···kC ! equivalent calculations
of the same multinomial coefficient.
Next, we show that H(C) is decreasing in C for C ≥ 4. Notice that













































≤ 0 for C ≥ 4.
So,
F (k2, . . . , kN) ≤ H(C) ≤ H(4) = 27
104
.
Therefore, we have the lower bound of R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) as
R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) ≥ min T (k2, . . . , kC)
B(k2, . . . , kC)
=
1













Proof of Lemma 1.3.3. We directly calculate the lower bound of R˜(z1, . . . , zC). In this
case, one can show that zC ≥ C − 1 and z1 ≥ (C − 1)C−1, so the zC1 dominates the rest
of terms in R˜(z1, . . . , zC). Since the coefficient of z
C
1 is the same in the numerator and
denominator, one can expect, in this case, R˜(z1, . . . , zC) to be close to 1.




akzk ≤ (C − 1)
C∑
k=2
ak−1zk ≤ (C − 1)x.
Then
R˜(z1, . . . , zC)
=
a1(a1z1 + y)
2(a0z1 + x) + a2(a1z1 + y)(a0z1 + x)x+ a3(a0z1 + x)x
2
a0(a1z1 + y)3 + a1(a1z1 + y)2x+ a2(a1z1 + y)x2 + a3x3
=
(Cz1 + y)
2(Cz1 + Cx) + (C − 1)(Cz1 + y)(Cz1 + Cx)x+ (C − 1)(C − 2)(Cz1 + Cx)x2
(Cz1 + y)3 + C(Cz1 + y)2y + C(C − 1)(Cz1 + y)x2 + C(C − 1)(C − 2)x3
≥ A+ (2C
3 − C2)z1x2 + (3C2 − C)z1xy + C(C − 1)(C − 2)z1x2
A+ y3 + C3z21x+ 2C
2z1xy + C2z21y + 2Cz1y
2
≥ 7y
3 + (2C3 − C2)z21x+ (3C2 − C)z1xy + [C2(C − 1) + C(C − 1)(C − 2)]z1x2










A = Cz1(Cz1 + y)
2 + C(C − 1)(Cz1 + y)x2 + Cxy2.
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The first inequality comes from dropping C(C − 1)(C − 2)x3 in both the numerator
and denominator. The second inequality follows from the facts that A ≥ 7y3 and C2z21y +
2Cz1y
2 ≤ C2(C − 1)z21x + C(C − 1)z1xy + C(C − 1)2z1x2, since y ≤ a1z1 = Cz1 and
y ≤ (C − 1)x ≤ Cx. The last inequality follows by the assumption that C ≥ 4.
Proof of Lemma 1.4.1. We derive the optimal condition of the objective function to
bound λ1 and λ2. Recall that our objective function in the case of C = 2 is
max λ1(p(λ1)− c)P1 + λ2(p(λ2)− c)P2
= max
2µλ1λ2(p(λ1)− c) + 2µ2λ2(p(λ2)− c)
λ1λ2 + 2µλ2 + 2µ2
:= f(λ1, λ2) (1.21)
Denote γi = −p′(λi). Notice that if λ = −ap + b is linear, then γ1 = γ2 = 1a . Taking
































































































. Therefore, we have
z1 =
√

























































Proof of Lemma 1.4.2. We show in this case G(β, z2) is nondecreasing in z2 so that
we can plug in the upper bound of z2 to find the maximum of G(β, z2). Letting A :=√




z32(3 + 4β + β
2) + z22(5 + 3β
2 + 3A+ 3β(2 + A)) + 2z2(1 + β
2 + A+ βA)− 2βA
A
. (1.24)




, Equation (1.24) is guaranteed to be non-negative since the
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coefficient of βA equals 3z22 + 2z2 − 2 which is non-negative. Therefore, we can plug in the









(1 + β)2β + 2(1 + β)
√
2β + 1






(1 + β)2β + 2(1 + β)
√
2β + 1 + 2
:= h(β).
Next, we find the maximum value of h(β) by looking at the first order condition. Setting





2β5/2 + 4β3 − 4β2B + β(2− 4B) + 2(1 +B)−
√


























2 + θ)θ(1 + θ2). (1.25)
Squaring both sides gives the following polynomial,
16θ12 + 56
√
2θ11 + 210θ10 + 244
√




− 18θ6 − 36
√
2θ5 − 36θ4 − 48
√
2θ3 − 66θ2 − 12
√
2θ = 0.
The twelve roots to above equation are
θ ={−1.59237,−0.951779± 0.164422i,−0.750502± 1.74268i,
− 0.547073± 0.940637i,−0.401417, 0, 0.356881± 0.649577i, 0.768987}.
Since β ≥ 0, then θ =√β ≥ 0. Therefore, only θ = 0 and θ = 0.768987 can be the only real
valued solutions. Notice that θ = 0 is not the solution to Equation (1.25), therefore θ∗ =
0.768987 is the unique real solution to Equation (1.25). The corresponding β∗ ≈ 0.591341.
Since h′(0.1) ≈ 0.13 > 0 and h′(1) ≈ −0.007 < 0, then h(β) is increasing in [0, β∗]




Pricing Analytics for Rotable Spare Parts
In this chapter, we describe a comprehensive approach to pricing analytics for reusable
resources in the context of rotable spare parts, which are parts that can be repeatedly
repaired and resold. Working in collaboration with a major aircraft manufacturer, we aim
to instill a new pricing culture and develop a scalable new pricing methodology. Pricing
rotable spare parts presents unique challenges ranging from limited data availability, minimal
demand information, and complex inventory dynamics. We develop a novel pricing analytics
approach that tackles all of these challenges and that can be applied across all rotable spare
parts. We then describe a large-scale implementation of our approach with our industrial
partner, which led to an improvement in profits of over 3.9% over a ten month period.
2.1 Introduction
In this work, we focus on the engineering and implementation of a systematic pricing ap-
proach for thousands of rotable spare parts at a major aircraft original equipment manufac-
turer (OEM). (For confidentiality reasons, we shall strictly refer to our industrial partner as
‘the OEM’.) In addition to manufacturing, a large part of the business is ensuring a high
quality of customer service, which includes the ability to provide spare parts for all operating
aircraft. (Note that aircraft is both singular and plural.) The management of spare parts
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is increasingly critical as the age of the fleet increases and the number of aircraft no longer
under warranty increases. Due to the increasing opportunities for spare part sales, there
has been increased availability of spare parts by competitor service providers. Thus, pricing
spare parts optimally, while maintaining a high level of service, has become progressively
more challenging and paramount over the years.
The OEM faces the challenge of pricing thousands of different spare parts. Such pricing
decisions present unique challenges, especially for an important subclass of parts called
rotable spare parts, for which the selling process is quite different than the regular spare parts.
Rotable spare parts, which is the subject of this work, represent a majority of spare parts
sales, with price tags of up to hundreds of thousands of dollars per unit. When purchasing
a rotable spare part, a customer will give their broken unit to the OEM in exchange for a
functional unit. This swap of a broken part for the functional part is known as an exchange
sale. The OEM will then send the broken unit to a repair facility. When the broken part
is repaired and sent back, it is then placed back into the OEM’s inventory and can be sold
again. We remark that rotable spare parts are an example of a reusable resource, which are
a subject of increased attention due to the increasing popularity of ride sharing and cloud
computing systems.
One key characteristic in selling rotable spare parts in that the total number of units
is fixed for the OEM. These units are divided into two groups: the on-hand units which
are available for sale and the in-repair units which are not available. Moreover, since there
are many competitors in the market, when a customer asks for a rotable spare part but the
OEM has no available units, then the sale will almost certainly be lost to a competitor. Note
that substituting one part number for another is not physically possible. Although dynamic
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pricing policies are natural to consider and were our original intent, i.e., a policy where the
price changes depending on the number of available units, we actually utilize a static pricing
policy as it is near-optimal empirically and theoretically. This stems from the work we have
established in Chapter 1.
The objective of this project is to redesign and improve the pricing process while utilizing
all available data, and ultimately provide a systematic and scalable approach to pricing in
this context. In collaboration with experts from the aircraft OEM, we developed a novel
and systematic approach that leverages existing data and captures the special features of
rotable spare parts to derive the best pricing strategy to maximize profit. The existing
approach, prior to our work, to pricing rotable spare parts was driven only by the repair
cost, and did not factor in repair time, competition, and the special inventory dynamics.
More broadly, the project is also one that aims at changing the conversation about pricing
within the organization, potentially uncovering scope for systematic approaches to pricing
of other offerings by the firm.
2.1.1 Unique challenges
Our engineering approach for the price optimization tool we developed dealt with the fol-
lowing challenges unique to rotable spare parts:
1. Modeling the special inventory dynamics and market competition.
The rotable selling process has its own unique inventory dynamics, where the inventory
constraints, stochasticity in repair time, as well as market competition, all play critical
roles. Capturing this information and synthesizing how it should impact price decisions
53
is key for a successful model.
2. No knowledge on price-demand relationship.
The OEM, in accordance with common practice in the aircraft industry, does not
often change the prices of rotable spare parts. This, in turn, provides very little
information on the price sensitivity of customers and more broadly the relationship
between expected demand and price.
3. Limited data for each rotable spare part.
Although in the aggregated level, the amount of available data is reasonably large, the
data associated to each rotable spare part is very limited due to the slow moving nature
of the system. Most rotable spare parts are highly expensive parts with lifetimes of
many years. A typical rotable spare part may be purchased only two or three times
per year, and thus parameter estimates are inherently noisy.
2.1.2 Timeline and general approach
This project started in the Summer of 2016, culminating with a large-scale controlled con-
trolled experiment ending in Spring 2019. Figure 2.1 depicts a timeline of the project,
highlighting some key steps.
It is important to note that an initial pilot program was conducted to obtain buy-in within
the organization on the potential for adjusting prices, and specifically ensuring that the
market is indeed price-sensitive. With this successful pilot and early buy-in on the potential,
significant effort was put in developing a tailored mathematical model that addressed all the
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of the project
or proxies when it was not directly possible. This involved a big effort in aggregating various
disparate data sources living on different systems, cleaning the data, and quantifying the
residual uncertainty on the inputs needed. Finally, we developed a pricing analytics tool that
allowed users to get default price suggestions based on the available data. In Figure 2.2, we
present an overview of the data-driven systematic approach we developed in the project.
We developed a model for rotable spare parts that can be used to understand the profit
rate as a function of the total number of units, demand rate, repair time, and prices. To













Figure 2.2: Data-driven pricing approach
OEM and factor in other business constraints on the maximum price changes. Once the
optimal prices are found on the estimated model, the prices are then robustified in the sense
that we potentially change the price so that we ensure that it is robust to the uncertainty in
all the parameter estimates. We highlight the importance of the robust approach to ensure
that prices are not overly sensitive to our assumptions and the high level of uncertainty in
some inputs. A key feature of the decision support tool we developed is that the data and
the uncertainty associated with some inputs (and their implications) can be overridden by
the users, allowing users to challenge their own assumptions or potentially refine the inputs
with knowledge not codified in the existing databases.
After review and testing of the tool, together with the OEM, we decided to launch a
large-scale controlled experiment to test the suggested price changes. We use the robustified
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price to guide how we split the rotable spare parts into the control and test groups for the
implementation. Based on 10 months, we evaluated that the new system lead to an increase
of 3.9% in profits under a difference-in-difference analysis. Equally importantly, this project
has led to multiple other initiatives around pricing analytics within the organization.
2.1.3 Related literature
There has been a long history in research on inventory management of rotable spare parts
dating back to Allen and D’Esopo (1968). Since then, many studies have been conducted in
inventory management of repairable parts such as Graves (1985) and Cohen et al. (1989) who
studied the problem of determining optimal inventory levels. Guide Jr and Srivastava (1997)
provided a review of models and applications of repairable inventory. More recently, several
studies focused on aircraft spare parts. Simao and Powell (2009) used approximate dynamic
programming to determine the inventory level of aircraft spare parts at each warehouse
while Aisyati et al. (2013) studied the inventory policy using a continuous review model.
Muckstadt (2004) provides a comprehensive overview of modeling approaches and solution
methodologies for addressing service parts inventory problems.
At a high level, the system dynamics of rotable spare parts could be considered as a
closed-loop supply chain. There are many works have been done in this broad domain such
as Fleischmann et al. (2003), Savaskan et al. (2004), Guide Jr and Van Wassenhove (2009),
Calmon and Graves (2017). Another stream of works focuses on allocation and overhaul
planning of rotable spare parts such as Tedone (1989), Arts and Flapper (2015), Erkoc and
Ertogral (2016).
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Relatively fewer works focus on finding best pricing strategies in selling rotable spare
parts, typically in the context of reusable resources. Gans and Savin (2007) study dynamic
pricing to maximize the expected profit for rentals. Their model considers discounted rewards
with a discrete price ladder, although with multiple customer types. They show the near-
optimality of static pricing in highly utilized rental systems where both the offered load and
system capacity are large. In Chapter 1, we showed a static pricing policy is provably near-
optimal in all parameter regimes and such results hold even when the number of units is
small, which is the case for rotable spare parts that we examine. Lei and Jasin (2018) studied
a related pricing problem of reusable resources where the service time is deterministic.
We remark that there has been a limited but steady stream of literature on successful
pricing model implementations such as Smith and Achabal (1998), Natter et al. (2007), Caro
and Gallien (2012), Ferreira et al. (2015), Simchi-Levi and Wu (2018). These implementa-
tions are typically for in fast-moving industries such as fashion or online retail where there
is a wealth of data. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on the
implementation of a pricing model in a slow-moving environment, and the first such work in
the context of reusable resources.
2.2 Rotable Spare Parts Pricing
2.2.1 Model and assumptions
We begin by describing a model that captures the expected profit rate of rotable spare part
as a function of its price and inventory dynamics. We note that this same model shall be
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applied to each (of the thousands) rotable spare part separately. For each rotable spare
part, the total number of units is fixed. We let C denote the total number of units, which
is also referred to as the pool size. Customer requests are assumed to arrive to the OEM
according to a Poisson process with rate Λ > 0. Given the current price, p, of the rotable
spare part, a customer decides to purchase the rotable spare part if their willingness-to-pay
exceeds p. We denote by λ(p) the effective arrival rate at price p, which we shall later fit to
be a decreasing, linear function. When a customer decides to purchase a unit of the rotable
spare part, they will give their broken unit back to the OEM in the exchange sale. The
OEM will then send the part for repair, and incur an associated expected repair cost c. The
repair time (including travel time) of the rotable spare part is assumed to be exponentially
distributed with mean µ−1 periods. We note that both interarrival times and repair times
are each generated from independent and identically distributed processes.
Since both the interarrival and repair times are exponentially distributed, the rotable
selling process can be modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP) where the state is one-
dimensional. Specifically, the state is one of {0, 1, . . . , C}, which represents the number of
unit that the OEM currently has on-hand (available for sale). The transition rate of having
i units on-hand to i + 1 units on-hand thus is (C − i)µ because there are (C − i) units
repair, each with an i.i.d. repair time with mean 1
µ
. On the other hand, the transition rate
of having i units on-hand to i − 1 units on-hand is simply λ(p). Figure 2.3 illustrates the
Markov chain embedding of our model. The numbers in the circle represent the number of
on-hand units currently in the system.
The goal is to find the optimal price of the rotable spare part to maximize the expected
profit rate, i.e., the product of the arrival rate, profit per unit sold, and availability (steady-
59
0 1 2 3 · · · C
Cµ (C − 1)µ (C − 2)µ (C − 3)µ µ
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Figure 2.3: Underlying Markov chain
state probability of having at least one unit to sell). Letting P0(p) denote the steady state
probability of having zero units available (stock out probability), then our objective to
maximize the expected profit rate can be written as
max
p
λ(p)(p− c)(1− P0(p)), (2.1)












Since the demand rate λ(p) is assumed to be decreasing in p, the profit of selling one unit,
p − c, is increasing in p, and the stock out probability P0(p) is decreasing in p, there is
a non-trivial trade off between making more profit per sale, the rate of selling, and the
availability.
In this model, we capture the competition in the market through the term λ(·), while the
inventory dynamics including the total number of units and repair time of a rotable spare
part is captured in the stock out probability P0(·). These key inputs were not captured by
the previous ‘cost+margin’ method employed in the past.
Although in principle a dynamic pricing policy is optimal for this MDP, and was the
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original intent of the project, we instead relied on a static pricing policy for two reasons.
First, from a performance perspective, numerical tests showed that the best static price loses
at most 2.5% compared to dynamic pricing and theoretically Chapter 1 proved the near-
optimality of a static price in such systems. From the data, 2.5% is generally smaller than
the average error of our estimated input parameters. Second, from a practical perspective,
a static pricing policy allows the OEM to keep its current practice of publishing a catalog of
prices for rotable spare parts at the beginning of each year and maintaining the same price
throughout the year. There will be no need to develop a new system for deploying the new
pricing algorithm.
2.2.2 Justification of assumptions.
In deriving the price optimization model, we made two key assumptions which we seek to
justify: 1) customers arrive according to a Poisson process and 2) repair times are random,
and specifically exponentially distributed. Throughout the rest of the chapter, we will use
two generic examples of rotable spare parts, a sensor and a jack, to illustrate our ideas.
Since the system of selling rotable spare parts is very slow-moving, many rotable spare
parts have very limited sales during the year. Figure 2.4 depicts the average sales per year of
each rotable spare part from 2010 to 2017. One observes that there are significant differences
across spare parts in terms of volumes but also one notes here the very slow-moving nature
of the environment. The majority of rotable spare parts have less than 3 units sold per year,
in which case estimating the repair and interarrival times is naturally very noisy.
To gain some intuition on the distribution of interarrival and repair times, we focus
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of sales volume
on rotable spare parts with higher volumes. For instance, Figures 2.5 shows the empirical
distributions for the sensor and jack. Similarly, we look at the empirical distributions of the
repair times for the sensor and jack in Figure 2.6. Though the price of the parts may be
changed by the OEM at the beginning of the year by at most 3% due to inflation, we ignore
such changes when calculating the interarrival time.


























Figure 2.5: Typical histograms of interarrival times
In Figures 2.5 and 2.6, we also depict the best-fit exponential curves (red dashed line)
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Figure 2.6: Typical histograms of repair times
to the data. The data suggests that both interarrival and repair times are inherently quite
random, and exponential fits appear to be reasonable. Admittedly, for the repair time a
better fit might be a deterministic time plus an exponential time, although this type of
random variable would impose significant technical challenges. The exponential fit, while
not perfect, captures most of the shape of the empirical distribution.
Moreover, the behavior above is fairly typical across other rotable spare parts with volume
of at least 3 units per year. To demonstrate this, we compute the coefficient of variation of
the interarrival and repair times for each rotable spare part. In Figure 2.7, we report the
empirical coefficient of variations (CV) of interarrival and repair times for all spare parts
with more than 3 units sold per year.
A large proportion of the parts have coefficients of variation around 1 for both interarrival
and repair times, in line with the assumed variation based on the exponential assumption.
Moreover, the minimum CV we find is significantly far from zero, motivating the use of
random times in our model. We shall later account for imperfections in the model by adding
a robust component to our pricing algorithm. While the data is not perfectly in line with
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Figure 2.7: Histograms of the coefficient of variation of the interarrival and repair times
the exponential assumption (which would lead to an exact CV value of 1), the exponential
assumption captures the randomness associated with repair times while allowing us to have
a tractable function to optimize.
2.2.3 Price sensitivity of customers
One question initially raised by our industry partner was how price-sensitive customers were,
and whether there was significant potential for price optimization. To test this, and before
engaging fully in a revamp of the pricing process, we conducted a simple pilot program
on a limited group of rotable spare parts in the summer of 2016. The approach in the
pilot program was to discount parts with low sales and low risk of backorders so as to not
to disturb the existing supply chain. To do so, we selected the parts and discount levels
according to a decision tree as shown in Figure 2.8.
We changed prices of rotable spare parts in three leaves of the decision tree. We started
the pilot program on July 12th, 2016 by reducing the price on 182 parts while another





























no yes no yes
no yes
no yes
Figure 2.8: Decision tree of selecting discounts for rotable spare parts.
considered 77 days before and after the start date of the pilot program and performed a
difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis. Our analysis suggested an overall increase in profit
of 17% and an estimated increase in sales volume of over 44%.
Although the pilot was relatively short and the parts included in the pilot program
represent only a small portion of rotable spare parts, mainly the parts with very limited sales,
the results of the pilot program indicated that there is significant potential for optimizing
prices. This provided some evidence that customers are indeed conscious of price changes
in the rotable selling market and that that this is an environment where data-driven pricing
can be leveraged to optimize prices. Furthermore, the pilot program convinced our industry
partner of the need to systematize their pricing approach, and they decided to launch our
pricing analytics approach across the entire rotable spare parts supply chain. Next, we detail
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how key inputs were estimated for our model.
2.3 Input estimation
The estimation of inputs required extracting, aggregating, unifying, and cleaning data across
multiple databases at the OEM. Moreover, estimating the demand function λ(p) was a
particularly challenging task due to the fact that the OEM rarely changes prices of their
parts beyond inflation adjustments.
2.3.1 Pool size
The OEM identifies rotable parts at two levels, individual and family. An individual part
has its unique part number while a family may contain several individual part numbers if
they have different generations or are symmetric parts (one is applied to the left of the
airplane and the other to the right). Given various business constraints at the family level,
and the need to aggregate data for very slow moving parts, our analysis is performed at the
family level. Aggregating all data sources, we constructed the mapping of individual part
numbers to their family part number, applicability (models of airplanes that the family can
be used), and the description of each family. Aggregating data from on-hand and in-repair
inventory for each individual part, and leveraging the family-individual mapping above, we
obtain the total number of units in each family. This number corresponds to C in our price
optimization model. For our two running examples, we have 10 units of the sensor and 11
units of the jack.
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2.3.2 Repair time and cost
We collected the records of repair orders for the last 10 years. Using the mapping of part
number to family number, we calculated the average repair time (also called Total Turn
Around Time (TTAT)) and repair cost for each rotable spare part family. These estimates
correspond to the parameters 1/µ and c in our price optimization model. In addition, we
also calculated the standard deviation of these two quantities which is used later when we
robustify our optimized prices. The average repair time of the sensor is 2.88 months with a
standard deviation of 2.92 months, while the average repair time of the jack is 3.79 months
with a standard deviation of about 3.34 months. The costs for these examples are not
reported for confidentiality reasons.
2.3.3 Price-demand relationship
The estimation of inputs above is fairly straightforward and the main difficulty is dealing
with missing data, outliers, and accounting for the remaining uncertainty (that we deal with
by “robustifying” our prices later on). However, a key input for which no estimate is available
in the data is the relationship between price and demand, i.e., the function λ(p). Estimating
a demand curve is challenging in general, but even more so in a setting with almost no price
experimentation. (A price experiment would take years due to the slow-moving nature of
rotable sales).
The given data only provides one point on the demand curve, which is the current price
and the corresponding current demand rate, For example, for the sensor, the current demand
rate is about 1.5 sales per month at its current price, and for the jack, the current price has a
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demand rate of about 0.8 units per month. Quite notably, there is no counterfactual under-
standing of price changes. This presents a unique challenge. Can one still approach pricing
in a systematic fashion without a demand-curve? Is there a proxy for such a demand curve
despite the structure above? We develop below a systematic approach in this environment.
This should be seen as providing a starting point in estimating the demand curve and we will
discuss how we deal with the remaining uncertainty later when we “robustify” the suggested
prices.
The approach we take is one of assuming a linear structure of demand and attempting to
obtain a proxy for demand at an alternate point, a hypothetical price where the OEM would
be able to capture full market share Λ (or close to it). Using the current price point and this
alternate point, we simply fit a line between these two points to generate λ(p). Figure 2.9
illustrates the proposed demand model. With such an approach, the question becomes one
of 1) estimating a price at which one would capture full market share and 2) estimating the
total demand, Λ in the market for any part. After discussions across the firm with experts,
we make the assumption that the firm can get full market share if the price is set to the
average repair cost or half of the current price, whichever is higher.
Since we have already estimated the current demand rate of each rotable part, we next
need to estimate the current market share so that we can calculate the full demand rate.
Note that if p˜ is the current price and MS is the market share, then the estimate of the full
demand rate Λ is λ(p˜)/MS. Although the OEM may have knowledge on the market share of
its rotable sellings business at an aggregate level, however, the market share at each rotable
part level is unknown.








Figure 2.9: Demand model
at the part level and we investigated many of those. Repair logs of airplanes are one source,
however, only around 70% customers use a common software, and in a lot of cases, the
removal of a rotable spare part is only for testing or is a precedent step of fixing another
part. This data source, while effective in theory, proved to be highly incomplete in practice.
We also investigated the data in user manuals to try to infer frequencies of replacements
needed, but these lead to inaccurate estimates of demand as the service manuals are more
geared toward inspection than replacements. We also analyzed the rotable purchase history
from warranty customers and the OEM owned aircraft, of which all the purchases of rotable
spare parts can be safely assumed to be from the OEM. However, the purchase frequency
of warranty customers and the OEM owned aircraft is not representative of the entire fleet
because the models of their aircraft are limited and the age of their aircraft are relatively
new.
Given the limitations above with all available data sources, we decided to adopt a simple
but robust way to estimate the current market share. Rather than focusing on parts, we
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focus on customers and airplanes. We assume, according to common practice in the aircraft
industry, that each rotable spare part needs to be replaced at least once every ten years.
For any rotable spare part i, we can calculate the total number of customers who should
have bought the part over 10 years, Ti, by simply counting the number of airplanes that
the rotable spare parts can be applied on. On the other hand, from the sales data, we can
extract the number of distinct customers who bought the rotable spare part i, denoted by




in this approach, we underweighted the customers who regularly shop from the OEM and
overweighted the customers who seldom purchase from the OEM.
As an example, we estimated that the market share for the sensor to be 30% while the
market share of the jack to be 22%. We notice that most of the estimates may have some
error associated with them due to the limited amount of recorded data for each rotable spare
part. We directly address this in the development of the pricing analytics tool by providing
estimated bounds on the market share and generating prices that are robust to changes in
the inputs.
2.4 Price Optimization and Robustification
A natural approach would be to simply compute the optimal price for each spare part under
the estimated inputs by solving (2.1). However, as stated earlier, there are multiple sources
of potential errors in the estimation of the inputs given the unique environment we operate
in. We develop a robust pricing approach to account for such potential errors in calculating
the suggested price for each rotable spare part. The main idea in calculating the suggested
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price is to treat the estimate inputs as ranges of possible values rather than just a fixed value
since the initial estimates may not be accurate due to lack of data. We select the price that
works the best on a variety of scenarios, which would make the suggested price to be robust
to estimation error. We developed the following procedure to calculate the suggested price
for a given rotable spare part.
Rotable Spare Part Pricing Algorithm
Step 1. Find the candidate prices
– Estimate inputs (C, 1
µ
, c, market share(MS)).
– Calculate the base optimal price, popt by solving (2.1).
– Compute the minimum and maximum prices that can achieve at least 95% of
optimality under estimated inputs, denoted by pmin and pmax.
Step 2. Select a robust price
– Generate 1, 000 inputs ( 1
µ′ , c
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MSmin = max{min{0.8MS,MS − 0.05}, 0.01}
MSmax = min{max{1.2MS,MS + 0.05}, 0.99}.
– Evaluate the average profit rate of popt, pmin, and pmax under each set of generated
inputs (C, 1
µ′ , c
′,MS ′) on the objective function in (2.1).
– Return the price with the highest average profit value.
In our running examples of the sensor and the pump, the optimal price for the sensor
to reduced the price by about 11%, while price reductions associated to the minimum and
maximum prices of 95% optimality are 18% and 4%. After evaluating the three candidates,
the final suggested price is chosen to be the optimal price from the model which is about a
11% decrease of the original price. In the jack example, the price reductions of our candidates
are 24%, 16%, and 10%. After evaluating on randomly generated inputs, the highest price
candidate is the selected suggested price and this corresponds to a 10% price decrease. The
main reason we chose the maximum candidate as the final suggested price for the jack is
due to the high variance in the repair cost, in which case the algorithm tends to be more
conservative.
2.5 Implementation
In this section, we discuss the visualization and decision support tool we developed for
helping the OEM in the implementation as well as the controlled experiment conducted at
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the OEM for 1,702 rotable spare parts.
2.5.1 Visualization and Decision Support Tool
Figure 2.10: Visualization and Decision Support Tool.
In Figure 2.10, we show a screenshot of the Visualization and Decision Support Tool.
This tool is implemented in Python using the Tkinter package for the GUI. On the top left
of the tool, there is a panel that allows the users to search and choose the rotable spare part
(by family number) they want to analyze. After the user selects a specific rotable part, the
basic information such as part number, usage, applicability (which models it can be applied
on), and past sales of that rotable part are displayed in the lower left corner. Next, the
estimated inputs of the price optimization model are displayed in the top middle region of
the tool. Instead of displaying the estimated market share, we choose to display the range
of the market share. The minimum and maximum market share levels are calculated using
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the formula described in the algorithm above.
We designed the entries of inputs to be editable so that if the users do not agree with our
estimation, they can manually overwrite the value. Note that if the minimum and maximum
market shares are changed, then the estimated market share is updated to be the average
of the minimum and maximum. Another advantage of making the entries editable is that it
allows the users to do what-if analyses, which may help them in other part of the operations.
For example, they may want to understand whether to increase or decrease the pool size,
and how to negotiate with repair agents on repair time and cost.
When the users agree on the value of inputs and click calculate, the suggested price as well
as the percentage change will be displayed at the lower middle part of the tool. This price is
the output returned by the algorithm described above. In addition, since the estimation of
market share contains the most uncertainty, we built a sensitivity analysis function in the tool
to show how different market share level will impact the suggestion. This corresponds to the
histogram on the right side of Figure 2.10. To create the histogram, we generate ( 1
µ′ , c
′) 1,000
times using the same procedure described in Step 2 of the algorithm. Then, we calculate







′,MSmax) according to different levels of market share. Finally, the histograms of
percentage of changes associated to the optimal prices is plotted on the visualization and
decision support tool. The sensitivity analysis aims to provide guidance to the users on the
direction of the price change (whether to increase or decrease the price). As long as the
users believe the range of the market share is correct, the sensitivity analysis will provide
the frequency of optimal price changes. Even if the users choose not to follow the suggested
price, the sensitivity analysis may inform the users which direction the price should go in
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order to maximize the profit rate. The users can leverage this information as well as other
business constraints to make a final decision.
Overall, the tool we developed serves as a decision support tool which gives a suggested
price which is robust to input estimation errors for a given rotable spare part. This tools helps
the users in making pricing decisions and understand the implications of the assumptions
they have about market shares, pool size, repair time, and repair cost.
2.5.2 Experiment design
We now describe the controlled experiment we conducted to test the effectiveness of our
pricing analytics tool. To ensure the control and test groups are comparable, for each
rotable part selected in the test group, one needs a ‘similar’ rotable part in the control
group. One natural way is to look at the estimated inputs of the price optimization model
of each rotable spare part. If every estimated input is similar between two rotable spare
parts, then one could claim these two parts are similar, and more importantly, the suggested
changes of these two parts would be similar as well. However, this approach did not work
because there are barely two rotable spare parts of which all estimated inputs are similar.
To overcome this difficulty, we propose the following procedure in selecting parts into the
control and test groups.
Part Selection Procedure
Step 1. Group rotable spare parts by their usage category, e.g. valve, pump, etc.
Step 2. In each usage group, sort rotable spare parts in ascending order based on
their suggested price changes.
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Step 3. In each usage group with size at least two, select the rotable spare parts
according the following rule. For i = 1, 3, 5, 7, ..., randomly assign one of i and
i+ 1 into the test group and the other into the control group.
If the size of the usage group is odd, randomly assign the last part into test or
control.
Step 4. Combine usage groups of size one, repeat Step 2 and Step 3 for the
combined group.
The key idea behind this selection procedure is that the usage of each rotable spare parts
is a natural classifier of different rotable spare parts. Instead of focusing on the similarity of
all estimated inputs between two different rotable spare parts, which is a high dimensional
clustering problem, we just focus on the outcome, the suggested price changes, which is
the result of running the price optimization algorithm described above. This leads to a
one-dimensional problem, thus the selection method is easy to explain internally in the
organization.
Using the above procedure, 852 out of 1,702 rotable spare parts are selected into the
test group and the remaining 850 rotable spare parts are in the control group. Within the
test group, 744 rotable spare parts are selected to receive price decrease while the prices
of 108 rotable spare parts are set increase. In the control group, we decrease the prices on
743 rotable spare parts and increase the prices on 107 rotable spare parts. We handed the
visualization and decision support tool as well as the lists of the control and test groups to
the team at the OEM in the Spring of 2018. The OEM’s team used the tool while updating
input estimates on 498 rotable spare parts and reviewed the suggested changes for each
rotable spare part, and decided on the best price while using tool.
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2.5.3 Implementation results
The OEM changed the price of the rotable spare parts in the test group on May 4th, 2018
and sent a notification to its customers. The notification sent by the OEM did not include
the part numbers of the rotable spare parts that received price change so that we can isolate
the effect of the price change from the marketing effort.
We collected the sales data of the 1,702 rotable spare parts from July 7th, 2017 to March
5th, 2019. This data represents the sales of rotable spare parts for 208 working days before
and after the implementation of price changes. We perform a difference-in-difference (DiD)
analysis in the aggregate level to measure the effect of our price optimization model as well
as the decision support tool.
Since the objective of the price optimization model is to maximize the expected profit
rate, therefore, in the DiD comparison, we focus on the profit changes in two groups before
and after the implementation. From the DiD analysis, we see an estimated impact of 3.9%
increase in profit from our pricing analytics tool. We omit the details of the analysis due to
confidentiality reasons.
To ensure the increase in profit is not contributed by some days with very good (or poor)
sales records, we provide a confidence interval of the DiD estimate of the profit increase.
The interval is generated by generating 10,000 randomly generated bootstrapped datasets
consisting of 208 working days with replacement in both before and after periods. For each
dataset, we compute the DiD estimate and find that the confidence interval of the estimate
to be [3.61%,3.95%]. Conservatively, the new pricing algorithm may add over millions of
dollars of profit per year in selling rotable spare parts for the OEM.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this collaboration project with a major aircraft OEM, we investigated the problem of
setting appropriate prices in selling rotable spare parts. We adopted a data-driven price
optimization approach to maximize the expected profit rate in rotable selling, which can also
be used for a broader class of problems concerning reusable resources. This approach captures
the special system dynamics such as fixed pool size, random repair times, exchange sales,
and market competition, most of which are not taken into account in the legacy approach.
In addition, the algorithm proposed and the tools developed allow users to understand the
implications of input errors and to be robust against these.
We conducted a large-scale controlled experiment on 1,702 different rotable spare parts
at the OEM starting in the beginning of May 2018 and received encouraging implementa-
tion results. The successful implementation demonstrates the power of a structured and
systematic pricing analytics approach, even when facing a slow-moving environment.
As of today, the OEM is engaged in expanding and building an internal version of the
visualization and decision support tool so that it can seamlessly integrates with internal
data flows. This methodology and its refinements will be a core part of pricing rotable spare
parts. In addition, this project opened up the discussion of a systematic review of pricing
processes across the organization, which has lead to multiple new projects including rental
tool pricing and service center quote estimation.
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Chapter 3
Pricing Reusable Resources with Multiple Customer Classes
We consider the problem of pricing reusable resources when there are multiple classes of
customers. This is an extension to the single class problem analyzed in Chapter 1. To deal
with the curse of dimentionality of the problem, we propose two types of heuristics. The first
is based on the construction of simple pricing policies directly from the optimal dynamic
pricing policy. The second is based on the construction of static pricing policies in a split
system where units are dedicated to each class. We provide numerical experiments showing
the performance of the proposed heuristics. In addition, we present a performance guarantee
of the static pricing policy on the simplest version of the problem where there are only two
units and two classes of customers. We also discuss the role of substitution effects between
different classes of customers.
3.1 Introduction
In some applications of selling reusable resources, customers may be able to be distinguished
into different classes based on their service time, sensitivities to the price changes, and
market sizes. Recall an example of a reusable resource is a rotable spare part. An original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) may use the same rotable spare part to serve two classes
of customers, those who want to rent and those who want to purchase (exchange sale). If
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a customer rents the rotable spare part, then the rental time would be the service time. If
a customer chooses to do an exchange sale, then the customer gives the broken part to the
OEM in exchange for a functional one. The time to repair the broken part would be the
service time. In this example, rental and exchange sale customers are two different classes
of customers since the market size, price sensitivity, and service time of each class is very
different.
Another example of managing reusable resources facing multiple classes of customers
happens in the service centers of an aircraft OEM. A service center manages a certain
number of hangar spaces, which is a kind of reusable resource, to perform maintenance tasks
for its customers. Naturally, there are several levels of maintenance tasks which are based on
the total usage/condition (e.g. 10,000 miles vs 50,000 miles maintenance for cars, 1,200 hours
vs 3,600 hours maintenance for planes). Though each maintenance task only requires one
hangar space, different levels of maintenance tasks have different prices and service times.
In such a setting, one cannot simply treat all customers to be in the same class and thus
multiple classes are required.
To this end, we want to study the problem of pricing for reusable resources when facing
multiple classes of customers. We focus our analysis on a model where a service provider
manages a fixed pool of a single type of reusable resource. The firm uses these units to
deliver service to its customers over an infinite time horizon. Each class of customers arrive
to the system according to a Poisson process where the rate depends on the price set for
its class and this rate may or may not be depended on the prices for other classes. We
make a standard assumption that the revenue rate for each class is concave in its arrival
rate. Upon arrival, customer uses one unit of the reusable resource for an exponentially
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distributed amount of time which depends on their class. The unit being occupied by the
customer cannot be acquired by other customers before service completion. The firm may
occur a service cost which also depends on the customer’s class. The goal of the firm is to
set a simple pricing policy which maximizes its long-run expected profit rate through selling
the reusable resources.
3.1.1 Related literature
There have been many studies on reusable resources and our work is an extension of the work
presented in Chapter 1, where we prove a universal guarantee for static pricing when only
one class of customers present. There are some studies on managing reusable resources with
multiple customer classes. For example, Gans and Savin (2007) analyzed the rental system
facing multiple contract and walk-in classes and showed that static policies are asymptot-
ically optimal. Levi and Radovanovic´ (2010) formed a linear program to devise a class
selection policy for revenue management in systems with reusable resources and prices are
fixed. They prove that their class selection policy achieves at least half of the optimal ex-
pected long-run revenue rate for their model with a single resource. For more related research
on reusable resources, as well as the comparison between dynamic and static pricing policies,
refer to Chapter 1 and the reference therein.
Aside from the studies of reusable resources, our model for pricing reusable resources fac-
ing multiple classes of customers is related to research on revenue management of multiclass
queues. Maglaras (2006) studied the problem of revenue management of an Mn/M/1 queue
using a fluid analysis and proposed a simple pricing heuristic which has near-optimal perfor-
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mance numerically. C¸elik and Maglaras (2008) studied the problem of maximizing profit at
a make-to-order manufacturer which provides multiple products. They derived near-optimal
dynamic pricing, lead-time quotation, sequencing, and expediting policies based on an ap-
proximation diffusion control problem. In Afe`che (2013), the author considered the problem
of designing a price/lead-time menu and scheduling policy to maximize revenues from two
types of heterogeneous time-sensitive customers. The author showed that a strategic delay
policy, which prioritizes impatient customers, but artificially inflates the lead times of patient
customers, may be optimal. Our work is also related to research on flexibility in queueing
systems (e.g., Sheikhzadeh et al. (1998) and Gurumurthi and Benjaafar (2004)) since we
consider a heuristic where splitting resources is required.
Our study on comparing a system with and without substitution effects in demand is
related to research on substitutable products. For example, Ceryan et al. (2013) studied a
joint implementation of price- and capacity-based substitution mechanisms where a firm pro-
duces substitutable products via a capacity portfolio consisting of both product-dedicated
and flexible resources. They characterized the structure of the optimal production and pric-
ing decisions and explored the effects of changing various problem parameters to the optimal
policy structure. Other studies on substitutable products include pricing and quantity de-
cision of a single period problem at a retailer (Tang and Yin 2007), demand management
and inventory control (Song and Xue 2007), and joint ordering and pricing strategy (Ye
2008). Most of these papers assumed infinite production capacity, which is different from
our setting where we only manages a fixed number of units and our goal is to find price
decisions to maximize profit rate.
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3.1.2 Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following way. In Section 3.2, we present the
multi-class pricing model for reusable resources. We also discuss the way we model demand
with multiple customer classes. In Section 3.3, we propose two types of simple pricing policies
for our problem and provide numerical studies of the heuristics. In Section 3.4, we show a
performance guarantee of the static pricing policy on a special case where there are only two
units and two classes of customers. We then compare the case when substitution effects in
demand exists between different classes of customer to the non-substitution case in Section
3.5.
3.2 Model
In this section, we first present the pricing model for reusable resources with multiple cus-
tomer classes, which is an extension to the general model introduced in Chapter 1. We then
discuss the performance metric we focus on and basic properties. Finally, we describe the
demand model we consider to capture inter-class effects.
3.2.1 Multi-classes pricing model for reusable resources
We consider the problem of price optimization for reusable resources when there are multiple
classes of customers. The firm manages C units of a single type of reusable resource to serve
M classes of price-sensitive customers. These units are identical and non-perishable. At
any point in time, each unit of the resource is either available for sale or occupied by a
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customer (from any class). For example, an occupied unit can be one hangar space used for
a maintenance task or a rotable spare part on a rental customer’s plane.
We assume customers arrive to seek one unit of a reusable resource corresponding to a
Poisson process at rate Λ > 0. Each class has different willingness-to-pay function Fj(pj; p)
(p is the vector of prices) and choose to purchase one unit if their valuations exceed the
price set for its class, pj. Therefore, we denote λj(p) := ΛF¯j(pj; p) the effective arrival
rate (demand rate) for class j. After a customer of class j purchases, one unit of the
reusable resource is then occupied for a random amount of time which follows an exponential
distribution with mean 1/µj. We assume that the usage times are i.i.d. across the customers
in the same class and independent of the customer’s valuation.
While a unit is being occupied, the firm cannot sell that unit until it is returned to the
system, i.e., the hangar space is released after finishing the maintenance or a rental customer
returns the rotable spare part. The firm incurs a cost cj to serve a class j customer. We
assume that if all units are occupied when any customer arrives, that customer will be lost
regardless of the price being offered.
3.2.2 Performance metric
The objective of the firm in selling the reusable resources is to maximize the expected
profit rate. Because of the assumptions of Poisson arrivals and exponential usage duration
for every class of customers, the system of selling reusable resources can be modeled as a
Markov Decision Process (MDP). Let nj denote the number of class j customers in the
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system, then the state space S can be expressed by
S = {(n1, . . . , nM) :
M∑
j=1
nj ≤ C, nj ≥ 0, nj ∈ Z, ∀j = 1, . . . ,M}.
Given a state s ∈ S , the firm’s action is to set the price for each class of customers, denoted
by the vector of prices by ps. Let λjs denote the demand rate of class j customers for state
s. The transition probability between states can be expressed as






j=1 nj ≤ C − 1
0, otherwise.




, if nk ≥ 1
0, otherwise.
Finally, the immediate reward of serving a class j customer is pj − cj.
Let P be the price decisions for the system, P is a M × |S| matrix. Note that ps is a
column in P. Denote Ps(P) the steady-state probability of the system being in state s under












where λjs and pjs are the demand rate and associated price for class j customer in state
s under price decision P. One may use standard techniques such as value iteration and
policy iteration to solve this MDP. The main difficulty in solving the MDP is the curse of
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dimentionality since |S| = O(CM).
3.2.3 Demand model
In our model, we consider two types of demand relations across different classes. One is
the non-substitution case where the price for each class has no effect on the demand rate of
other classes. Managing the hangar spaces at service centers described in Section 3.1 is an
example of this type because the level of maintenance tasks is mandatory based on the usage
of the planes, one cannot choose to do a lower level maintenance even if the price is lower.
In general, in such application, the demand rate for a certain level of maintenance tasks
would only be affected by the price of that level and would not be affected by the prices of
other levels. On the other hand, we also consider the substitution case where the demand
rate for a certain class is not only determined by the price for that class, but also affected
by the prices of other classes. The rotable spare parts serving both rental and exchange
sale customers is a good example for this case. When seeking a functional rotable spare
part, some customers are in-between renting or buying a rotable spare part. Their decisions
depend on the list prices of the two options and they will choose the one which results in a
lower total cost based on their preferences.
To this end, we assume that the demand rate of one type of customer may or may not
be affected by the prices for the other type of customers. We shall assume for each class j,
the demand function λj(p) has the following properties: i) λj(p) is decreasing in pj ii) λj(p)
is non-decreasing in pk, for all k 6= j. The first condition ensures that for any class, the
price set for that class has a negative effect on its demand rate while the second condition
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represents the substitution effects brought by the prices of other classes.
An example of demand functions satisfying the above two properties are linear functions
with the form
λ = Ap + b, (3.2)
where A is an M×M matrix in which the diagonal entries ajj < 0 and other entries ajk ≥ 0,
for all j 6= k. The diagonal entries represent the main price-demand relationship for each
class of customers, and thus these entries are assumed to be negative. The off-diagonal
entries represent the effects of price of other classes, and we assume the customers from one
class may shift to another class if the price is low enough. Notice that in the case where
ajk = 0, it represents the condition that the demand rate for class j is not affected by other
classes. The vector b represents the demand rate when prices for all classes are set to zero.
Notice that the linear demand function presented in Eq. (3.2) is used in the numerical
experiments presented later in this chapter.
3.3 Heuristics
One may use value iteration to find the optimal policy to the MDP presented in Section 3.2.
However, the optimal solution to the general multi-classes customers pricing model suffers
from the drawback of the curse of dimensionality since the size of state space S is on the
order of CM . Therefore, to apply the optimal policy in such a system may be impractical.
Inspired by the performance guarantee shown in Chapter 1, we aim to understand how a
simple pricing policy performs in the multiple class setting. In this section, we propose two
different pricing heuristics where there is no substitution effects between different classes of
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customers.
3.3.1 Construction from the optimal dynamic policy
In this subsection, we first describe heuristics to the multi-classes system based on the
optimal dynamic pricing policy, then we provide the numerical experiments showing these
simple pricing policies have good performance under various input parameters.
The first idea we investigate is to directly construct the static pricing policies from the
optimal policy, which follows the method described in Chapter 1 since such construction is
shown to be near-optimal in the single class case under all parameter regimes. The algorithm
to construct the Static Pricing Heuristic is the following. We construct a single static price
for every class.
Static Pricing Heuristic
Step 1. Solve the MDP optimally using value iteration, let λ∗js denote the opti-
mal demand rate of class j customers in state s = (n1, . . . , nM), and P∗s be the
corresponding steady-state probability under the optimal policy.










Step 3. Form the pricing heuristic leading to arrival rates (λ˜1, . . . , λ˜M).
Notice that in the construction of the Static Pricing Heuristic, for each class, we make
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the expected demand rate under the static pricing policy equal to that under the optimal
policy when the system is not fully occupied (customers can be accepted).
The Static Pricing Heuristic reduces the number of prices of the system from O(MCM)
to M . One may wonder whether using a static pricing policy is too restrictive since it ignores
inventory levels. We next propose another simple pricing heuristic, the Level-dependent Pric-
ing Heuristic, which has more flexibility than the Static Pricing Heuristic and still maintains
a simple structure. The algorithm is as follows.
Level-dependent Pricing Heuristic
Step 1. Solve the MDP optimally using value iteration, let λ∗js denote the optimal
demand rate of class j customers of the state s = (n1, . . . , nM), and P∗s be the
corresponding steady-state probability under the optimal policy.
Step 2. For each system occupancy level, l = 0, . . . , C − 1, calculate the demand










Step 3. Form the pricing heuristic based on the occupancy level l = 0, . . . , C − 1




j = 0, ∀ j.
Note that Eq. (3.4) ensures the expected demand rate for each class of customers at any
occupancy level is the same as in the optimal policy under the same occupancy level. The
Level-dependent Pricing Heuristic contains CM prices. Notice that the construction of the
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Static Pricing Heuristic presented earlier in Eq. (3.3) can be viewed as a weighted average
of the Level-dependent Pricing Heuristic (Eq. (3.4)).
We next discuss the numerical experiments conducted to demonstrate the performance
of the two proposed heuristics. In the numerical experiments, we focus on the setting where
M = 2 (two classes of customers) due to computational limits. As stated in Section 3.2, the
demand functions used in the numerical studies are linear functions (see Eq. (3.2)). In the








Let µ1, µ2 denote the usage rate of class 1 and 2 customers, respectively. In the numerical
experiment, we vary C from 2 to 8. In each level of C, we calculate the optimal profit rate
and the profit rate under two proposed pricing heuristics using all combinations of a11, a22,
b1, b2, µ1, and µ2 where
a11 ∈ {−0.1,−0.2,−0.3,−0.4,−0.5}
a22 ∈ {−0.05,−0.1,−0.15,−0.2,−0.25}
b1 ∈ {3, 5}
b2 ∈ {1, 2}
µ1 ∈ {0.1, 0.2}
µ2 ∈ {0.5, 0.8}.
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In the experiment, we set the cost of serving both classes to be zero. The results of the
numerical experiment are summarized in Table 3.1.
C 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Level Policy
Average 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9%
Worst 98.9% 99.0% 99.2% 99.4% 99.5% 99.6% 99.6%
Static Policy
Average 99.2% 98.7% 98.3% 98.2% 98.1% 98.1% 98.2%
Worst 94.7% 94.3% 94.0% 94.2% 94.5% 95.0% 95.4%
Table 3.1: Comparison of simple pricing heuristics and the optimal policy, M = 2
As one may observe, the performance of the Level-dependent Pricing Heuristic is near
optimal for all levels of C which indicates that the loss caused by reducing O(MCM) prices
to MC prices is minimal. Moreover, even when only M prices are used in the Static Pricing
Heuristic, the average loss of the optimality is less than 2% in the experiments and the
worst case loss is less than 6%. In addition, one may notice that under any level of C, the
performance of the level-dependent policy dominates that of the static policy. Due to the
curse of dimentionality, e.g., for the case of C = 8, it takes around 1 minute to compute
the result for 1 instance, we did not run the experiment on larger C or more input sets.
We believe the results in Table 3.1 still demonstrate the good performance of simple pricing
policies in such an environment when facing multiple classes customers and is an interesting
future direction for theoretical results.
In addition, we numerically search for the combination of inputs for the worst case
performance of the static pricing heuristic. We discover that the performance of the Static
Pricing Heuristic becomes worse in the case where a11  a22, b1  b2, and µ1  µ2. For
example, when a11 = −10, a22 = −0.001, b1 = 50, b2 = 0.1, µ1 = 0.01, µ2 = 10, comparisons
between the performance of the Static Pricing Heuristic and the optimal expected profit rate
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under dynamic pricing policy is summarized in Table 3.2. One may observe that the worst
C 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Static Policy 80.6% 79.6% 80.2% 80.9% 81.7% 82.4% 83.0%
Table 3.2: Worst case performance of Static Pricing Heuristic, M = 2
case performance of the static pricing heuristic is at least 79.6% for all levels of C. We will
provide a theoretical guarantee later in Section 3.4 for the performance of the static pricing
heuristic when C = 2.
3.3.2 Splitting resources
We next examine another heuristic which is to transform the shared system (all units can
serve all classes) to a split system where a certain class of customers are served by a subset
of units. Such applications may appear in service centers where the hangars are the reusable
resources to be used for different maintenance tasks. One may prefer a dedicated assignment
when certain level of maintenance tasks requires some unique and heavy equipment that are
inconvenient to be transported between hangars. We want to investigate, under such an
environment, how the split system performs compared to the shared system.
Let C be the set of all possible splittings of C units of resources, then C is defined as
C = {(C1, . . . , CM) :
M∑
j=1
Cj = C, Cj ≥ 0, Cj ∈ Z ∀j = 1, . . . ,M}.
Let P(C1, . . . , CM) denote the optimal profit rate under splitting (C1, . . . , CM) ∈ C. Then
94
we have




where Pj(Cj) represents the optimal profit rate (allowing for dynamic pricing) that can be
achieved when assigning Cj units to class j customers exclusively.
We now describe the method of splitting resources. We want to find the optimal splitting
such that the total expected profit rate in the split system is maximized. Notice this splitting
method has the advantage that solving the MDP described in Eq (3.1) is not required. This
would be helpful when one faces a system with many units and classes. We now describe the
algorithm to form the static pricing heuristic (Optimal Splitting Heuristic) through splitting
the resources.
Optimal Splitting Heuristic
Step 1. Evaluate P(C1, . . . , CM) for all possible splitting (C1, . . . , CM) ∈ C.
Step 2. Select the splitting (C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
M) which gives the highest expected profit
rate, which is (C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
M) = arg max(C1,...,CM )∈C P(C1, . . . , CM).
Step 3. Construct the static policy for each class j using the same method as in
Chapter 1 using C∗j units and the optimal prices from Pj(C∗j ).
We next provide numerical results to show the performance of the Optimal Splitting
Heuristic in the split system. The parameters in the numerical experiments are the same
as described in Section 3.3.1. First, we compare the expected profit rate in the split system
using static policies (Optimal Splitting Heuristic) to the optimal expected profit rate in
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the shared system. In addition, since Optimal Splitting Heuristic also provides a way of
constructing of static prices, we want to examine the performance of such a static pricing
policy in the shared system. We report the average and worst ratios for both cases based on
different levels of C. The results are summarized in Table 3.3.
C 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Split system Average 95.4% 94.5% 93.8% 93.4% 93.3% 93.3% 93.4%
(no sharing) Worst 83.2% 86.5% 86.8% 87.4% 88.3% 88.7% 89.5%
Shared system
Average 96.4% 95.2% 94.5% 94.5% 95.5% 96.3% 96.8%
Worst 81.2% 66.9% 66.7% 69.2% 75.0% 79.6% 83.2%
Table 3.3: Performance of Optimal Splitting Heuristic, M = 2
As one may observe, on average, the loss due to splitting resources is less than 7%, and
the worst case loss is less than 18%. This result suggests adopting a split system should
also be acceptable option to the firm when there exist some soft constraints in managing
reusable resources. Moreover, though the average performance of the static pricing policy
from Optimal Splitting Heuristic in the shared system is higher, one would better stick on
the split system because such static pricing policy has a more robust performance in the
split system. For example, when C = 4, we can get at least 86.8% of the optimal profit
rate in the split system while applying static policy from Optimal Splitting Heuristic to the
shared system only obtains 66.7% of the optimal profit rate in the worst case.
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3.4 Performance Guarantee on Two Units Two
Classes System
In this section, we provide a performance guarantee of the static pricing policy on the simplest
multi-classes system where the firm manages only two units of the reusable resource to serve
two classes of customers. In this section, we make the following change to the notation where
λjs = λjs. The states in the MDP of such system are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 2), (1, 1), and
(2, 0). Figure 3.1 illustrates the transitions between the states under a static pricing policy.
We adopt the same approach as in Theorem 1.3.1 in Chapter 1 to get a lower bound on
the performance of the static policy in such system.
(0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 2)












Figure 3.1: State transitions of C = 2, M = 2 system for static policy
Theorem 3.4.1. When C = M = 2, if the revenue function of each class is concave, the
best static pricing policy can achieve at least 80% of the optimal expected profit rate from the
dynamic pricing policy.
Proof. Let λ∗1(i, j) and λ
∗
2(i, j) denote the optimal arrival rate for class 1 and 2 customers
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when we have i class 1 customers and j class 2 customers in the system. Denote P∗(i, j) the
stationary probability of having i class 1 customers and j class 2 customers. We construct












1−∑i+j=2 P∗(i, j) (3.6)
Let P∗ and P λ˜1,λ˜2 denote the expected profit rate under optimal policy and the con-
structed static policy, respectively. Assume that the revenue rates for both classes of cus-
tomers are concave in λ, we have
P λ˜1,λ˜2
P∗ =







1(i, j))− c1) + λ∗2(i, j)(p(λ∗2(i, j))− c2)]P∗(i, j)
=












≥ λ˜1(p(λ˜1)− c1) + λ˜2(p(λ˜2)− c2)









Pλ˜1,λ˜2(0, 0) + Pλ˜1,λ˜2(0, 1) + Pλ˜1,λ˜2(1, 0)
P∗(0, 0) + P∗(0, 1) + P∗(1, 0)
(3.7)
The inequality follows from applying Jensen’s inequality to concave functions. Again, we can
bound the ratio of expected profit rate under the constructed static policy and the optimal
policy by the ratio of stock-in probabilities. Note that such relation holds for arbitrary C
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and M as long as the profit rate function for each class is concave.
From the balance equations, we can calculate the steady state probabilities of states
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Constructing the static pricing policy based on Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6) using Eq. (3.8), we then




j(0, 1), µj,∀j = 1, 2. The resulting equation
has 219 terms in both numerator and denominator and the full expression can be found in
Section 3.7. Finding the minimum coefficient of each term in numerator and denominator
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yields the 80% result.
3.5 Substitutable Demand
In some applications, there may exist substitution effects in demand between different classes
of customers where increasing the price for one class may shift the customer from that class
to other classes. One example of such a situation in the rotable selling business is where
some rotable spare parts can be both rented and sold. Customers choose to rent the rotable
spare part if they have an outside contractor that can repair their broken part and the total
price (rental price from the OEM plus the repair price from the contractor) is less than the
exchange sale price from the OEM. In such a setting, increasing the rental price may push
the customer from renting to buying from the OEM. Also, exchange sale customers may
choose to rent if the exchange sale price increases or rental price decreases. In this section,
we analyze and compare the system with substitution to the system without substitution and
show that if all parameters stay the same as in the system without substitution, introducing
substitution effect will improve the expected profit rate in selling the reusable resources.
Let λ0j(p) denote the demand function for every class j in the system where there are
no substitution effects in demand of different customer classes. Denote λ1j(p) the demand
function for class j customers in the system with substitution effects. We make following
assumptions to the demand functions.
Assumption 3.5.1. Let f(x1, . . . , xm) be an m-dimensional non-decreasing function, the
demand functions λ0j(p) and λ
1
j(p) have the following properties:
• λ0j(p) = f(0, . . . , ajjpj, . . . , 0) where ajj < 0.
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• λ1j(p) = f(aj1p1, . . . , ajjpj, . . . , ajmpm) where ajk ≥ 0 for all k 6= j.
In the example of linear demand functions of the form of λ = Ap + b, the coefficient
matrix A0 of a non-substitution system has the property that the diagonal entries ajj < 0
and other entries a0jk = 0 for all j 6= k. While in the substitution case, the coefficient matrix
A1 has the same diagonal entries as A0 and at least one of the off-diagonal entries ajk > 0.
Theorem 3.5.1. Under Assumption 3.5.1, for any C, M , µj, bj, j = 1, . . . ,M , let P∗sub and
P∗reg denote the optimal expected profit rate with and without substitution effects, respectively.
We have
P∗sub ≥ P∗reg.
Proof. For any state s, let λ0
∗
js denote the optimal demand rate for class j customers under
λ0j(p) (no substitution), and denote p
0∗
js the associated optimal price and P0
∗
s the steady-state








j(p) to the system of






because λ∗js is a feasible policy to the system under λ
1
j(p).
Furthermore, for any state s, the steady-state probability in Pλ
∗
js
sub is exactly the same as
that in P∗reg, which equals P∗s. This is because the transition rate for any state s is the same
in two systems.
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Let p1js be the price to achieve λ
0∗
js in state s for class j in the system with substitution
effects. Recall in λ1j(p), the demand rate is increasing in at least one pk. Therefore, p
1




















js − cj)P∗s = P∗reg.
This theorem establish the fact that the presence of the substitution effects is beneficial
to the firm in maximizing the profit rate in selling reusable resources.
Next, we provide the numerical experiment showing the extra profit rate potential in a
substitution system. The inputs for the system with no substitution effects are generated
as the same in previous sections. For the substitution system, we additionally set a12 =
0.02 and a21 = 0.01. We keep the cross-class effects (a12 and a21) to be the same in the
numerical experiment. Since we are varying a11 and a22, keeping a12 and a21 the same
indeed reflects the different levels of substitution effect. We calculate the improvement by
introducing substitution effects, i.e.,
P∗sub−P∗reg
P∗reg , and the results of the numerical experiment
are summarized in Table 3.4. As one may observe, the average and maximum improvements
C 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Minimum 2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
Average 10.0% 9.3% 8.8% 8.4% 8.2% 8.0% 7.9%
Maximum 51.1% 45.1% 39.5% 35.6% 32.8% 30.7% 29.1%
Table 3.4: Improvement by introducing substitution effects, M = 2
by introducing the substitution effects diminish as the number of units the firm manages
increases while the minimum improvement almost stays flat. However, on average, the
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substitution effects can still bring a significant amount of additional profit rate in selling
reusable resources.
In addition, we evaluate the performance of both the level-dependent policy and the
static policy (introduced in Section 3.3.1) in the system with substitution and the results
can be found in Table 3.5. Notice that the performance of both policies on the system with
C 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Level Policy
Average 99.9% 99.9% 99.8% 99.8% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9%
Worst 98.8% 99.1% 99.2% 99.4% 99.5% 99.5% 99.6%
Static Policy
Average 99.2% 98.6% 98.3% 98.1% 98.1% 98.1% 98.1%
Worst 95.2% 94.7% 94.4% 94.3% 94.5% 94.8% 95.2%
Table 3.5: Performance of simple pricing heuristics in the system with substitution effects,
M = 2
substitution effects mimics that in the non substitution system as the optimality gaps are
almost identical for each level of C. This suggests that even when facing a system with
substitution effects, one can still adopt simple pricing heuristics from Section 3.3.1 which
will provide the majority of the profit rate gained under the optimal dynamic pricing policy.
3.6 Future Directions
We believe this work has provided promising evidence that a static pricing policy is near
optimal in selling reusable resources even facing multiple classes of customers. Consequently,
there are many research directions to consider. For example, one can try to generalize
the bound in Theorem 3.4.1 to arbitrary C and M . In addition, it would be interesting
to characterize the performance of the split system, this could relate to the literature on
dedicated versus flexible systems. Finally, it would be of value to further consider the
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substitution effects setting where introducing substitution will change the parameters in the
original demand functions, as this is closer to the situation in many real world applications.
3.7 Proof of 80% Bound
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